
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
EIGHTH EDITION, 1985

Edited by Walter Pforzheimer



Defense Intelligence College Washington, D.C. 20340-5485





BIBLIOGRAPHY OF INTELLIGENCE LITERATURE

A Critical and Annotated Bibliography of Open-Source Literature

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Edited by Walter Pforzheimer

EIGHTH EDITION (1985)

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5485



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FOREWORD

One of the hallmarks of a profession is a recognized body of literature that has grown up about and around it. By this measure, intelligence has long been able to claim the title "profession." However, intelligence, by its nature, has also given rise to a significant number of misinformed, partially correct and incorrect written accounts. Serious students, scholars and professionals need to know the extent to which their sources are accurate and reliable. This critically annotated <u>Bibliography of Intelligence Literature</u> is intended to fulfill that function.

The Eighth Edition of the <u>Bibliography</u>, like its predecessors, owes an inestimable debt to the untiring efforts of Dr. Walter Pforzheimer, an Adjunct Professor at the Defense Intelligence College. Those already familiar with the field of intelligence literature know that Dr. Pforzheimer is uniquely qualified to select and annotate entries for this <u>Bibliography</u>. After a career in intelligence that began in 1942 in Air Force Intelligence, and included being CIA's first Legislative Counsel (1946-56) as well as Curator of its Historical Intelligence Collection from 1956-1974, he is recognized as the foremost bibliographer and bibliophile in the field.

Readers of previous editions of the <u>Bibliography</u> will appreciate the care and attention that have gone into each entry. Information has been updated while new titles have been added and some older ones superseded. Brand new is the section on Intelligence Periodicals. What has not changed is Dr. Pforzheimer's meticulous attention to detail. That continues to set the highest standard for this <u>Bibliography</u>.

In the four years since the Seventh Edition was published, more than 15,000 copies have circulated. Requests for single and multiple copies continue to come from across the United States and around the world. The Defense Intelligence College, in the interest of furthering the intelligence profession, fully expects this new edition to be disseminated even more broadly and widely. Questions and comments should be addressed to: Editor, Bibliography of Intelligence Literature, Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. 20340-5485.

JOHN D. MACARTNEY

Colonel, USAF Commandant

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This annotated Bibliography of Intelligence Literature, since its first issuance in 1972, has been the product of many years of effort, contributions, and firm support by the faculty and staff of the Defense Intelligence College (formerly the Defense Intelligence School). However, special recognition is due to those individuals who have provided significant contributions to the preparation of the several editions of the Bibliography, of which the present is the eighth edition. Major John J. Guenther, USMC, (now Lieutenant Colonel USMC-ret. and Special Assistant to the Director of Intelligence, USMC), originally conceived and edited the first edition (1972) during his tour as Marine Corps Representative and faculty member at the School, 1970-1973. His were truly pioneering efforts in this field. Dr. John J. Dziak, a faculty member at the School, 1966-1976, and now a senior official of the Defense Intelligence Agency, significantly expanded and refined the **Bibliography** as the Editor of the second (1973), third (1975), and fourth (1976) editions. Almost from the beginning, Mr. Raymond Rocca, former Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency and for many years an Adjunct Professor at the School/College, has made fundamental and essential contributions to the <u>Bibliography</u> in the field of Soviet Intelligence and Security Services. Both Dr. Dziak and Mr. Rocca have continued to be most helpful to the Editor of this eighth edition.

In 1983, two major bibliographies on intelligence literature have been published commercially. These are Scholar's Guide to Intelligence Literature: Bibliography of the Russell J. Bowen Collection; and Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography by George C. Constantinides. Both of these works by two thorough-going professionals in the field of national security are noted in this eighth edition. Colonel Bowen and Mr. Constantinides have contributed much over the years to this Editor's thinking in preparing this edition of the Bibliography. Col. Bowen has supplied most of the text of two or three of the annotations here. From Mr. Constantinides the Editor has borrowed several ideas for a few of the annotations included. The literature of intelligence has been much enriched by the publication of their two bibliographies.

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This <u>Bibliography</u> of <u>Intelligence Literature</u> is intended to provide students and faculty of the <u>Defense Intelligence College</u> and intelligence professionals throughout the <u>Intelligence Community</u> with a selective listing of the most significant books in <u>English</u> on intelligence topics. The vast quantity of books on intelligence and frequently poor quality of much of this literature would make a fully comprehensive listing a difficult effort of dubious value. Rather, it was decided to concentrate attention on the most noteworthy books in <u>English</u> on intelligence, thus providing the reader with a selected, annotated and critical <u>Bibliography</u>, useful as a guide to reading on the intelligence profession.

The annotations represent a synthesis of several opinions, with primary emphasis given to reviews or critiques prepared by knowledgeable present and former members of the Intelligence Community. In that sense, the annotations provide this <u>Bibliography</u> with a uniqueness and validity rarely obtainable in other similar efforts, and make the <u>Bibliography</u> particularly valuable to the serious student or long-time practitioner of the craft of intelligence.

The bibliographical data on the listed titles include information as to whether the book contains source or bibliographical notes, whether it contains a bibliography, and the number of pages in each volume. Unless noted otherwise, each book listed contains an index. Where a given volume has an important substantive relationship with another title in this <u>Bibliography</u>, a "q.v." is added for cross reference. In cases where American paperback editions have been published (in addition to the original hardback volume), this is noted and referenced in parentheses commencing with the abbreviation "pap."

As with earlier editions, a brief essay on intelligence fiction is included. It is intended to introduce readers to the potential benefits --personal and professional -- inherent in the provocative and entertaining world of intelligence fiction. No attempt is made to offer a selective, critical listing of fiction in this essay. Aside from a few suggestions and noting of several classics of intelligence fiction, we wholly defer to the reader's individual tastes and interests.

Students, faculty, and other users are encouraged to submit brief book reviews, opinions, critiques, or such other contributions designed to improve the usefulness of the <u>Bibliography</u>. These contributions may be submitted to The Editor, <u>Bibliography of Intelligence Literature</u>, Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. 20340-5485.

Inclusion of a book in this <u>Bibliography</u> does not necessarily indicate endorsement of the contents. Numerous books on intelligence have received acclaim in various public reviewing circles, but are, in fact, error-ridden, biased, and incomplete when weighed against facts available within the Intelligence Community. Such books are included herein because they have been accorded this misleading public acclaim, are frequently publicly quoted or

referenced, and are to be found in the holdings of many libraries. When read with care and critical discrimination, even such works as these can have some marginal value for the serious student of intelligence.

Readers of intelligence literature are encouraged to consider the author's background and real access to intelligence information when judging the contents of such works. In this genre, as in others, the personal, professional and political biases of authors are often reflected in their writings. Moreover, authors who have written personal memoirs of their intelligence activities—usually in the operational field—often tend to produce much valid factual material while at the same time (in some cases) aggrandizing their own role. When studying these memoirs, the reader must bear in mind the unintentional distortions which result from the fallibility of human memory, especially when writing after the passage of years. This problem is unavoidable for writers who undertake serious history based in part on personal interviews with aging former participants.

Intelligence literature poses an additional fundamental problem created by dual forces inherent in its nature. On the one hand, intelligence operations hold a certain fascination for the public, and a readily available market exists for new and exciting "revelations." This is to be contrasted with the regular security procedures and compartmentation which frequently preclude public disclosure of the more significant facts. Accordingly, a highly discriminating approach is encouraged when dealing with literature of this kind.

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Books listed in this <u>Bibliography</u> which are considered particularly valuable for the serious student and intelligence professional are so designated with an asterisk (*). The accompanying annotation will provide further explanation.

The eighth edition of the <u>Bibliography of Intelligence Literature</u> continues the balance of the contents of previous editions. This includes selected titles on escape and evasion, the Resistance Movements in World War II, and Soviet intelligence and security services. For the first time, a few titles have been included solely on surprise attack and deception. Both are essential elements with which intelligence officers must cope. However, books on these subjects are a comparatively new element in the literature. With respect to those works written by Soviet and Bloc defectors, their available testimony before U.S. Congressional Committees is cited in the accompanying annotation to the book. It is felt that this is a useful addition, for, in the case of defectors, their personal memoirs frequently fail to display their full body of information. Study of the relevant Congressional testimony is an essential adjunct to supplement any research based on published defector accounts.

Intelligence Literature: An Alphabetical Listing by Author

AGABEKOV, George. OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror. New York: Brentano's 1931; (Reissued) Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1975. 277 p. No index.

Translated from the French translation of the original edition in Russian, G.P.U. (Zapiski Chekista), published in Berlin in 1930. Agabekov worked for the GPU/OGPU, 1920-1930, when he defected in Paris. His principal assignments were in Turkestan, Persia, Afghanistan and Turkey. This book appears to be more objective and more revealing of Soviet modus operandi than Agabekov's subsequent writing. He describes the internecine warfare and intrigue between the Foreign Ministry and Soviet intelligence representatives abroad, although Agabekov indicates no particular dissatisfaction with his job until the last chapter which explains the reasons for his defection. A personal relationship with the daughter-whom he married--of the British Consul in Istanbul was a key factor in his defection. He was also convinced that the GPU was being used to crush the proletarian masses in disregard of the "revolutionary cause," and that his own liquidation was approaching. Agabekov fled from Turkey to France in 1930, but disappeared in Brussels in 1938, presumably a victim of Soviet assassination squads. This is probably the most important book, from the historical point of view, in the literature of Soviet intelligence operations and organization in the 1920's.

AGEE, Philip. <u>Inside the Company: CIA Diary</u>. New York: Stonehill, 1975. 639 p. No index. (pap. N.Y.: Bantam, 1976).

Agee served twelve years in CIA, ending in 1969. His book purports to be a "diary" of his career there, first during his training period, and then as an operations officer in Ecuador, Uruguay, and Mexico. His own political change has brought him to aspire to be "a communist and revolutionary." The book is in reconstructed "diary" form, placed in time context by memory and research in Cuba and Western Europe. In it, the author purports to name many of his colleagues, agents and contacts in the countries where he served. His announced aim is to disclose as much as he can in order to force CIA into withdrawing its officers and shutting down its overseas operations, which Agee feels are oppressive to peoples throughout the world. Because of the plethora of names and pseudonyms which the author includes in his operational discussions, and the writer's polemical style, the book is tedious reading.

AGEE, Philip and Louis Wolf, eds. Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe. Seacaucus, New Jersey: Lyle Stuart Inc., 1978. Introduction by Philip Agee. 734 p. No index.

This book is an effort, largely by "new left" writers, to attack CIA activities in Europe, and more particularly to expose the alleged names of CIA employees overseas in an attempt to bring the Agency's operations to a

halt. Almost the first half of the book comprises articles, most of which have been previously published here or abroad. Several are by Agee. Other authors include John Marks and Victor Marchetti. The larger segment of the book consists of several hundred alleged CIA (and a few NSA) names with details of their putative careers taken from Foreign Service Lists, Embassy rosters, and supposed leaks. The list includes names of some intelligence officers now dead or retired; in many cases it is well out of date; and many of the names are wide of the mark with no intelligence connection. (A second volume, <u>Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa</u>, edited by Ellen Ray, William Schaap, Karl van Meter, and Louis Wolf, was published by the same publisher in 1979. It comprises a collection of anti-CIA articles by Agee and others, and a long list of biographical data of alleged intelligence personnel. Bibl. 523 p. No index.).

AKHMEDOV, Ismail Gusseynovich. <u>In and Out of Stalin's GRU: A Tatar's Escape</u> <u>from Red Army Intelligence</u>. Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1984. 222 p.

This is one of the few books which describes a Soviet officer's career, part of which was spent in the GRU - Soviet military intelligence. Akhmedov rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, defecting from his post as a GRU officer in Turkey in 1942. He came to the United States in 1953. In an interesting chapter, Akhmedov tells of his lengthy 1948 debriefing by Kim Philby, then British intelligence chief in Turkey.

- U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. <u>Hearing.</u> <u>Testimony of Ismail Ege</u>. (<u>Ismail Gusseynovich Akhmedoff</u>). (<u>Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments Part 15</u>). 28-29 October 1953. pp. 1001-1028, 1047-1067.
- U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. <u>Hearing</u>. <u>Testimony of Ismail Ege</u>. (<u>Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States Parts 3, 72</u>). 23 February 1956, 11 July 1957. pp. 57-75, 4395-4398, 4404.
- U.S. CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES. The Drive for Final Victory by Ismail Ege. In: The Great Pretense: A Symposium on Anti-Stalinism and the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. House Report No. 2189. 19 May 1956. pp. 63-66.
- ALDOUBY, Zwy and Jerrold Ballinger. The Shattered Silence: The Eli Cohen Affair. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1971. Bibl. 453 p.

Although it has not yet been possible to authenticate all the material in this book, it appears that the authors have compiled a reasonable account

of the Israeli Mossad agent, Eli Cohen, who successfully penetrated the Syrian establishment prior to his arrest and execution in 1965.

ALLISON, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971. Bibl. notes. 338 p. (pap. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.)

This is an excellent book on "decision making" as it might be applied to the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. The author develops three conceptual models for understanding government behavior, describes the logic of each model, and then applies the model to the Missile Crisis. The book discusses the role of intelligence and the use of intelligence support for policy making at that time. The author seeks to explain what the models show as to the behavior of the American and Soviet governments during the Crisis. Because a great deal more open information is available for input on the American side of the equation, the models tend to portray the American side to the best effect and fall somewhat short in explaining the Soviet behavior. Nevertheless, this is an important work for the intelligence analyst to study.

ALSOP, Stewart and Thomas Braden. <u>Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage</u>. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964. (pap. only). 237 p. No index.

This is a re-issue of <u>Sub Rosa</u>, which was originally published in 1946. It contains a new introduction by Braden and a new postscript by Alsop. The book gives fragmentary but authentic examples of a few OSS clandestine intelligence and paramilitary operations in Europe, Africa, and Asia. The authors were OSS parachutists behind the German lines in France.

AMERY, Julian. Sons of the Eagle: A Study in Guerilla War. London: Macmillan & Co., 1948. 354 p.

The story of Albanian Resistance movements during World War II by a British SOE officer who worked with some of them. (For broader reading on British covert operations in Albania and the Balkans during the war, see Amery's autobiography, Approach March, London: Hutchinson, 1973).

ARMBRISTER, Trevor. A Matter of Accountability: The True Story of the Pueblo Affair. New York: Coward-McCann Inc., 1970. 408 p. No index.

Armbrister asks why a combat-oriented naval bureaucracy sends an unfit intelligence ship, the <u>Pueblo</u>, commanded by an ill-informed officer, on a confused mission into dangerous waters near the Korean coast, and sets off a dramatic international incident? With this provocative question as a start, the author provides an informative and interesting book, well-researched, readable, and objective, although he cannot make a

comprehensive assessment of the considerable loss of U.S. intelligence data and equipment. The <u>Pueblo</u> case offers invaluable lessons for the student, manager, and practitioner of intelligence.

ARMSTRONG, John A., ed. Soviet Partisans in World War II. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964. Foreword by Philip E. Mosely. Selected bibl. 792 p.

The post-war Project "Alexander" was a part of the War Documentation Project, under an Air Research and Development Command contract administered by Columbia University. Initially it resulted in a series of monographs by excellent scholars on the origins, doctrine, operations, and effectiveness of Soviet partisan warfare in World War II. The source material was comprised largely of captured German and Soviet documents. Not all of the monographs are included in this volume, and some of those retained have been condensed. Of particular interest to the intelligence professional is Chapter V, "The Partisans in Soviet Intelligence." It describes Soviet intelligence as an instrument of control, as well as partisan intelligence operations. The whole volume is valuable for students in the field of guerrilla warfare.

* AUSTRALIA, Commonwealth of. <u>Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage</u>. Sydney: A. H. Pettifer, 1955. 483 p.

An official and extremely important report on Soviet intelligence activities in Australia in the early 1950's, growing out of the defection of the Petrovs (q.v.), two Soviet intelligence operatives. A major work. (For further study see the Royal Commission Hearings in this case, as well as the Commission's 10 p. Interim Report of 21 October 1954.)

AUSTRALIA, Commonwealth of. Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security. Report. Canberra: Australian Government Pub. Service, 1977.

On October 25, 1977, the Prime Minister of Australia acknowledged for the first time the existence of an Australian foreign intelligence service and a signals intelligence organization. Both organizations had previously been subject to "D" notices, and media reporting or speculation was not permitted. The Prime Minister made the acknowledgements in tabling before the Parliament four of eight reports of a one-man Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security. The four reports. evidencina sanitization, reflect the findings of Justice Robert Marsden Hope, Supreme Court of New South Wales, who conducted the three-year study. reports withheld deal with the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and the Defense Signals Division (DSD), since elevated to a directorate based on Justice Hope's recommendations. The Prime Minister foreclosed any thought that the withheld volumes would ever be issued, advising that the Australian Government would adhere strictly to the

practice of refusing to provide details of ASIS or DSD's activities, nor would it be prepared to enter into any discussion on these services.

The released volumes are:

1st Report - Deals with procedural matters relating to the Commission. 21 p.

2nd Report - Studies security checking, assessments and appeals. 198 p.

3rd Report - Abridged findings and recommendations, including the sinceimplemented establishment of a centralized, independent assessments capability (Office of National Assessments). 37 p.

4th Report - Study of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), assessment of effectiveness, findings and recommendations. (2 vols.) 268 p. + 199 p.

BABINGTON-SMITH, Constance. Air Spy: The Story of Photo Intelligence in World War II. New York: Harper and Bros., 1957. 266 p. (pap. N.Y.: Ballantine Books, 1957).

Personal narrative by a skilled British photo interpreter in WWII. Discusses development of photo reconnaissance and intelligence techniques and role of aerial photographs in the conduct of the war. Valuable for readers interested in this subject and period.

BAKELESS, John. Spies of the Confederacy. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1970. Bibl. notes. 456 p.

Colonel Bakeless offers his thesis that, in the first years of the Civil War, the Confederacy had a much better spy network than did the North -- a network reaching into the War Department and into the highest political circles in Washington. Because of the extensive documentation available, Colonel Bakeless has chosen to treat only Confederate intelligence activities in this book. It should be noted that some spy memoirs on which he draws are often exaggerated, and that many of the original records were destroyed in 1865.

* BAKELESS, John. <u>Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes</u>. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1959. Bibl. notes. 406 p.

An account of intelligence in the American Revolution considered to be the best general book presently available on that subject. Although somewhat fragmented and choppy, it is literally loaded with information on the intelligence-rich history of the Revolutionary War. George Washington

emerges as an imaginative and successful intelligence officer who was also skilled in deception operations.

BAMFORD, James. The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982. Notes (incl. bibl. notes). 465 p. (pap. N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1983).

This is the first published book which purports to be a comprehensive study of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). It is largely a product of the author's considerable research of open literature; careful collation of data (some unclassified and furnished by NSA itself); some of it originally highly classified but selected for release by Congressional committees; and interviews with a few former senior NSA officials, some of whose seeming indiscretions may have resulted in a few of the breaches of security in this volume. This book must be used with caution because of some errors of fact, and it could have been better edited. For the 1983 British edition of The Puzzle Palace, subtitled America's National Security Agency and its Special Relationship with Britain's GCHQ, Bamford has written a lengthy additional preface in which he presents his views on the case of Geoffrey Arthur Prime, convicted in Britain of espionage as a long time Soviet penetration agent in the cryptologic field, serving first in the RAF and then for several years in the Government Communications ers (GCHQ), the British counterpart of NSA. Bain this preface some data on the evolution, Headquarters Bamford also organization of GCHQ. This material on Prime and GCHQ is now included, in slightly revised form, as a 53 page Afterword in the American paperback edition of The Puzzle Palace.

* BARRON, John. KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974. Introduction by Robert Conquest. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 462 p. (pap. N.Y.: Bantam Books, 1974).

An excellent, authoritative and well written account of many major cases in which the KGB has been involved around the world. A lesser part of the text describes the KGB's massive internal security functions. The book includes some valuable details on the names of operatives and the organization of the KGB as of the time of publication. The section on the GRU, however, is somewhat weak. Of particular interest is Appendix C which sets forth translated extracts of a Top Secret KGB training manual entitled "The Practice of Recruiting Americans in the USA and Third Countries."

* BARRON, John. KGB Today: The Hidden Hand. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1983. Notes, incl. bibl. notes. 489 p.

 $\overline{\text{KGB}}$ Today is on a par in writing and authority with the author's 1974 book, $\overline{\text{KGB}}$, (q.v.). It is not a revision of, nor substitute for, the earlier volume, for it largely covers different ground and later cases.

An important segment of this book is devoted to a timely look at what the "active measures," which run the call covert disinformation and forgeries through political action (including manipulation of foreign media), use of front groups, support for international terrorism, and pro-Soviet direction for foreign peace and Of importance is the material on the control of disarmament efforts. "active measures" by the highest levels of the Soviet Party apparat, for which the KGB is the action arm. A major section of KGB Today sets forth valuable information provided Barron in his interviews with Major Stanislav Levchenko, the KGB officer specializing in Soviet "active measures" at his post in Japan until his defection to the U.S. in 1979. Another important chapter is entitled "The Main Enemy" (the KGB's name for the U.S.). Also included is material on the KGB's major efforts to obtain advanced American industrial, scientific and technical information and materials through clandestine collection. The reader should take special note of Barron's Appendix B: "Organization of the KGB," a short but excellent description of its present organization and functions as of the date of publication.

For additional useful reading on Soviet "active measures," note:

U.S. CONGRESS. HOUSE. PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE. Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive). 1980. Testimony of John McMahon, Deputy Director for Operations, CIA, et al. and Ladislav Bittman, former Deputy Chief of the Disinformation Department of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service. Also included is CIA's lengthy study: "Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda."

U.S. CONGRESS. HOUSE. PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE. Soviet Active Measures. Testimony of Major Stanislav Levchenko. 1982.

Also useful is a series of recent issuances entitled Special Report, issued by the Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. No. 88 (October 1981), No. 101 (July 1982), and No. 110 (September 1983) are on Soviet Active Measures, with illustrations. A series entitled Foreign Affairs Note, from the same source, dated from August 1982 to August 1983, is also available. The one dated April 1983 is entitled Soviet Active Measures. Four others are on aspects of the same subject but carry varying subject titles.

BARRON, John. MiG Pilot: The Final Escape of Lieutenant Belenko. New York: Reader's Digest Press, (McGraw Hill Book Co.), 1980. 224 p. (pap. N.Y.: Avon Books, 1981).

 $\frac{\text{MiG Pilot}}{\text{his}}$ tells the story of the defection of Viktor Ivanovich Belenko in his $\frac{\text{MiG-}25}{\text{Foxbat}}$ from Chuguyevka in the Soviet Far East to Hakodate on the Japanese island of Hokkaido and thence to the United States. But the

story does not end, as in most defector memoirs, with Belenko's arrival in the United States. A good half of the book is devoted to an account, through the eyes of the defector, of his debriefing and resettlement. It is this segment of the book which proves to be far more fascinating than the rather routine drama of the escape itself. Written in the chatty Reader's Digest style, the book is a useful addition to the lore of Soviet defectors.

BAR-ZOHAR, Michael. <u>Spies in the Promised Land: Iser Harel and the Israeli Secret Service</u>. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. 292 p. No index.

A biography of Iser Harel, who, for almost twelve years, served as the top Israeli intelligence officer. The book is also a study of the development and growth of a highly professional intelligence service.

BAZNA, Elyesa with Hans Nogly. I Was Cicero. New York: Harper and Row, 1962. 212 p. (pap. N.Y.: Dell, 1964).

An interesting account of the activities of the famous German World War II agent, Cicero, written by Cicero himself. Should be read together with Moyzisch's Operation Cicero (q.v.). Both books leave some unanswered questions.

BEESLY, Patrick. Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-18. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982. Bibl. 338 p.

Beesly, whose World War II experiences are described in Very Special Intelligence (q.v.), has written the most comprehensive history now available of Room 40, the British Admiralty's World War I codebreaking The book tells not only of the work against German naval and diplomatic ciphers, but also of the key personnel involved, such as the famous Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Sir William "Blinker" Hall, and some juniors who went on with distinction in the same work in World War II. Beesly not only writes lucidly of organizational problems and lessons learned, but also relates the roles played by cryptology and naval intelligence in such important events as the sinking of the Lusitania and the Zimmerman Telegram, both of which had a bearing on America ultimately entering World War I. In view of the paucity of certain information in regard to intelligence in World War I, Beesly is to be commended when he occasionally says, in effect: "As best as we can determine on this point, we think this is what happened from the evidence available, but we cannot be sure." It makes for an even more authoritative book.

BOOKS RESERVED BELLEVING B

* BEESLY, Patrick. Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre 1939-1945. Garden City, New York:

Doubleday, 1978. Foreword by Admiral of the Fleet the Earl Mountbatten of Burma. Bibl. 282 p. (pap. N.Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1981).

This important book is one of the most accurate of its kind. It describes the work of the Operational Intelligence Centre, a part of the British Admiralty's Directorate of Naval Intelligence during World War II. The Centre utilized all-source operational intelligence on German U-boats, naval forces, and raiders, in order to track, counter, and defeat those forces in the Battle of the Atlantic and Northern European Waters (including the British and American sea convoy routes for vital supplies). The use of communications intelligence - and often the lack of it - is carefully described as well as the problems caused by the German breaking of the British Naval convoy codes until mid-1943. The author served as the Deputy Chief of the submarine tracking room in the Centre throughout the war. Beesly has had access to many of the pertinent British and German naval records, including recently declassified ULTRA documents. (See also: Appendix 10 in The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943 by Jürgen Rohwer. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1977).

BENNETT, Ralph. Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign 1944-45. New York: Charles Scribner, 1980. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 336 p.

An historian, Bennett served as an Intelligence Corps officer for over four years at Bletchley Park, the British cryptologic center in World War II. After restudying thousands of decrypted and translated German Ultra messages, Bennett has related them, as appropriate, to specific actions, battles, and campaigns in Normandy and on into Germany from shortly before D-Day thru VE-Day. He also includes material as to what Ultra, on occasion, was unable to accomplish. While details sometimes make this book heavy going, it is highly regarded by many historians and specialists in the field.

* BETTS, Richard K. <u>Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning.</u>
Washington: The <u>Brookings Institution</u>, 1982. 318 p.

Indications and Warning Intelligence is a key increment of the intelligence profession. Of the recent writings in this specialized field, Surprise Attack by Betts is considered by some to be the most useful and authoritative. This volume, replete with examples from 1940 onward, analyzes the problems of being prepared for actual or potential surprise attack from the perspective of both the producers and users of intelligence. The book enunciates and studies such basic principles as: the need for analysis by intelligence professionals of advance information; the prompt dissemination of such analysis to policy makers responsible for minimizing or thwarting the surprise; and aiding the decision makers to understand the inherent problems with warnings, as well

as the negative and contradictory forces tugging at the minds of such policy makers, both political and military. The essential relations between the policy and decision makers and their chief intelligence officers are also stressed.

Political Warfare. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse Research Corp., 1972. 246
p. (pap. New York: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1981).

This important, interesting, and provocative book provides a rare "insider's" view into deception and disinformation operations as practiced by the Soviet and Czech intelligence services. Written by a former Czech intelligence officer, whose assignments in intelligence included one as deputy chief of the Czech Intelligence Service Department D from 1964 through 1966 and who defected to the West in 1968, it is one of the best available books on Communist peacetime deception operations.

U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. <u>Hearing.</u> Testimony of Lawrence Britt. (pseud. for Ladislav Bittman). 5 May 1971. pp. 1-19.

BLACKSTOCK, Paul W. Agents of Deceit: Frauds, Forgeries and Political Intrigue Among Nations. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. Bibl. notes. 315 p.

This book presents several case studies of political forgeries, from Peter the Great's Testament to the Cold War. Particularly pertinent with respect to "disinformation" operations.

BLACKSTOCK, Paul W. The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. Bibl. notes. 351 p.

Primarily a look at "covert political warfare" and the use of subversive techniques to influence the internal affairs of other nations. Through the use of past and recent historical examples, the author scrutinizes the problems and dangers inherent in such clandestine activity. In view of the author's biases and the lack of documentation on this difficult and necessarily secret activity, the book must be read with caution.

BLACKSTOCK, Paul W. and Frank L. Schaf, Jr. <u>Intelligence, Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Operations: A Guide to Information Sources.</u>

Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1978. 255 p.

This bibliography is of some limited use to the professional intelligence officer and to lay libraries and readers. Some of its annotations should be used circumspectly. A helpful feature is the inclusion of titles of selected periodical articles.

BLAIR, Clay, Jr. Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan. New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1976. Bibl. 1071 p. (pap. N.Y.: Bantam, 1976).

This book is primarily a study of U.S. submarine operations in the Pacific in World War II. However, the author, a prominent journalist and former submariner, also includes accounts of the breaking of the Japanese codes from 1922 through the war in the Pacific and the role of intelligence in enabling our submarines to locate and destroy Japanese shipping. While lacking much of the official documentation now available on the cryptologic war, Blair did well with the material at hand. Later works, however, have superseded this book to some extent. (q.v. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets and Lewin, The American Magic).

BLUM, Richard H., ed. Surveillance and Espionage in a Free Society. A Report by the Planning Group on Intelligence and Security to the Policy Council of the Democratic National Committee. New York: Praeger, 1972. Foreword by Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III. 319 p. No index.

This uneven book contains lengthy sections on both (U.S.) domestic and foreign intelligence, although the authors focus on "covert action" rather than clandestine collection. Of the various essays, those by David Kahn and Ithiel de Sola Pool merit closest attention. Highly critical in general of the U.S. intelligence community, the book includes numerous recommendations to improve U.S. intelligence and domestic security activities. Despite the subjective tone of much of the writing, the book is of value because it provides "outsiders'" critical reviews of intelligence activities.

BOROSAGE, Robert L., and John Marks, eds. The CIA File. New York: Grossman Publishers, 1976. Reference notes. 236 p. No index.

In September 1974, a two-day conference was held in Washington under the sponsorship of the Center for National Security Studies, an arm of the Fund for Peace. The subject of the meetings was "The CIA and Covert Action." This book presents reports given at the conference, virtually all hostile to covert action in particular, and to some extent to American intelligence in general. The participants included Victor Marchetti, David Wise, Fred Bronfman, Thomas Ross, Richard Falk, and Morton Halperin, inter alia. Mr. William Colby, then Director of Central Intelligence, spoke at the end of the conference, presenting the CIA position. Mr. Colby's paper is also included, as well as the questions from the participants and his answers to them following his formal presentation.

* BOURKE, Sean. <u>The Springing of George Blake</u>. New York: Viking Press, 1970. (pap. New York: Pinnacle Books, 1971). 364 p. No index.

An interesting, well-written and valuable account of the escape in 1966 from a London prison of a British MI 6 officer. George Blake, who was a

Soviet penetration agent convicted by a British court for violations of the Official Secrets Act and sentenced to 42 years. This book, written by the Irishman who engineered the escape, not only provides the fascinating story of the escape plot, but also gives an insight into the strange personality of Blake and the actions of the KGB in the Soviet Union after Blake and Bourke were reunited in Moscow. Bourke subsequently returned to Ireland, where he died in 1982.

BOVERI, Margaret. Treason in the Twentieth Century. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1963. Bibl. 370 p.

A brilliant, subtle, provocative analysis of treason during World War II, condensed from the original German text. Boveri's thesis is that treason no longer lends itself to strictly legal definitions but takes on more elusive connotations, which in turn may foreshadow the emergence of a new era in which the nation-state declines as the primal structure of society and is replaced by loyalty to a greater whole -- exactly what is not yet clear. Wisely, the author raises the questions rather than tries to answer them. The book brims with incisive comments and over thirty sharply-drawn character sketches of "traitors." There are sections on Collaboration (Quisling, King Leopold of Belgium, Marshal Petain, Admiral Darlan, Pierre Laval); Propaganda (William Joyce, Ezra Pound, Knut Hamsun); Resistance (the German opponents of Hitler); and Espionage (Rudolf Roessler and Otto John), among others.

BOWEN, Russell J.

See: Scholar's Guide to Intelligence Literature, p. 65 below.

BOYLE, Andrew. The Fourth Man: The Definitive Account of Kim Philby, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean and Who Recruited Them to Spy for Russia. New York: Dial Press/James Wade, 1979. Bibl. notes. 504 p. (pap. N.Y.: Bantam, 1980).

This book, (originally published in England under the title The Climate of Treason), created a sensation in the press, perhaps beyond its intrinsic merits as a book. It deals basically with the cases of the British Foreign Office and intelligence officers, Philby, Maclean, and Burgess, as Soviet spies, while indicating that there were "fourth" and "fifth" men. and perhaps more, in this Soviet network. The book led to the public exposure of Anthony Blunt, formerly a war-time member of the British Security Service, a distinguished art historian and Surveyor of the Queen's Pictures. Before the war, while at Cambridge University, Blunt was known for Marxist views and acted as a Soviet intelligence talent spotter. Blunt confessed his role to the British security authorities in 1964. In exchange for his information, Blunt was granted immunity from prosecution. As a result of this book's publication, the Prime Minister made a statement in the House of Commons exposing Blunt's case, followed by extensive revelations and debate in the press. The latter are perhaps of more interest than the book itself. The use of the word "Definitive" in the sub-title of this book is at best an exaggeration. Many more facts and much documentation is still lacking. (q.v. Page, et al., Philby, Seale and McConville, Trevor-Roper).

BRISSAUD, André. <u>Canaris</u>. <u>The Biography of Admiral Canaris</u>, <u>Chief of German Military Intelligence in the Second World War</u>. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1974. (Translated and edited by Ian Colvin). 347 p.

Andre Brissaud, a prominent French journalist and author of several books on the World War II period, attempts to answer the riddle of Admiral Canaris, Chief of the German Abwehr in World War II. Brissaud concludes that this mysterious figure, executed by the SS a month before Germany's fall, was neither a traitor to Germany nor a British agent. Rather, he was an intellectual who deplored Nazi excesses and, thus, occasionally assisted the Allied war effort. The author's style often assumes knowledge of World War II events on the reader's part. This edition appears to be somewhat abridged from Brissaud's original French text (Paris: Perrin, 1970), nor is it a final definitive work on the subject, although useful. (See also for further reading on Canaris: Heinz Höhne. Canaris. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1979. 703 p.).

BRISSAUD, André. The Nazi Secret Service. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 320 p.

The history of the formation, from 1933 to 1939, of the infamous Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the security arm of the SS, under the leadership of Reinhard Heydrich. Brissaud's journalistic style and professional knowledge of the World War II period make for interesting reading. Much of the book is well documented; however, it cannot compare in excellence to his work on Admiral Canaris. In too many areas Brissaud relies heavily on conversations of many years ago which time may have rendered suspect. It takes another specialist of this period to make valid use of the book and to update the later work of the SD.

BROOK-SHEPHERD, Gordon. The Storm Petrels: The Flight of the First Soviet Defectors. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978. 241 p. (pap. N.Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1982).

The author, a British journalist, presents a well written study of early Soviet defectors from 1928 until the beginning of World War II. The book commences with the defection of Boris Bajanov, personal assistant to Stalin and secretary to the Politburo. Bajanov, still living in France at the time of writing, defected in 1928 and was interviewed extensively by Brook-Shepherd. The four other major defectors described are Grigory Bessedovsky, Georges Agabekov (q.v.), Walter Krivitsky (q.v.), and Alexander Orlov (q.v.), the latter three from elements of Soviet

intelligence. The stories of other defectors are intertwined. As the author states in his preface, this book sometimes reads like "novels of spy fiction," but it is an authoritative and important work.

BUNCHER, Judith F., et al, eds. The CIA and the Security Debate: 1971-1975. New York: Facts on File, 1976. 362 p.

This volume is a topical-chronological compilation of extracts from reports of Congressional investigating committees, other government agencies, and newspaper files. Other than the introduction by Miss Buncher, there is little interpretation. The book, however, serves as a valuable reference tool for the researcher on the coverage of investigations of CIA activities from 1971 through 1975.

CALVOCORESSI, Peter. <u>Top Secret Ultra</u>. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980. 132 p. (pap. N.Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1981).

This short book focuses on one aspect of intelligence during World War II: the breaks into German high grade ciphers by a congeries of talented people (located at the British code and cipher center at Bletchley Park), and the exploitation of such breaks. It is the author's evaluation of a "single but extraordinary" source of strategic intelligence information by a working-level insider (who rose to be the chief air intelligence officer in this field at Bletchley). The author assesses the impact of cryptologic break-throughs on the course of the war against Germany. While his primary work involved the air aspects of this decrypted material, Calvocoressi also writes of its impact on the ground and naval services as well. Top Secret Ultra is a lean, lucid, and authoritative book; its main fault is that its historical exposition is almost totally devoid of the names of the participants in this work.

CAMPBELL, Rodney. The Luciano Project: The Secret Wartime Collaboration of the Mafia and the U.S. Navy. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1977. Bibl. 299 p.

The author describes the use of Mafia personnel (including the key figure, the imprisoned Charles "Lucky" Luciano) to secure the New York waterfront from sabotage and subversion of vital cargo shipments in the early stages of World War II. There is also indication of the use of some of these persons for positive intelligence, although fairly minimal, for the Allied invasions of Sicily and Italy. This book is based on the official 1954 report of the New York State Commissioner of Investigation, William Herlands, in support of Governor Dewey's proposed commutation of Luciano's prison term and the latter's subsequent deportation. At Naval Intelligence request, the Herlands Report was kept secret until 1976 when it was used as the basis of this accurate book.

CANADA. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE. Security and Information. First Report. Hull, Quebec, Canada: Canadian Government Publishing Centre. October 9, 1979.

This First Report of the Commission appointed to look into the intelligence activities of the RCMP deals almost completely with the legal aspects of the Canadian Official Secrets Act and proposed freedom of information legislation. It points out the difficulties of the impact of the latter on the former, and the problems of security in both fields. This First Report is accompanied by three separate studies prepared for the Commission by outside scholars. These are: Parliament and Security Matters; National Security: The Legal Dimensions; and Ministerial Responsibility for National Security. Since publication of the Royal Commission's First Report in 1979, two further Reports have now been published:

Second Report. Volumes 1 and 2. Freedom and Security under the Law, August 1981.

Third Report. Certain R.C.M.P. Activities and the Question of Governmental Knowledge. August 1981.

* CANADA. ROYAL COMMISSION. The Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate the Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust of Secret and Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power. Ottawa: Cloutier, 1946. 733 p. No index.

This is the official Canadian report on Soviet atomic espionage operations conducted by the Soviet Embassy in Canada during the immediate post-WWII period. It is based largely on the testimony and documents of the Soviet code clerk, Igor Gouzenko, who defected to the Canadians in 1945. (q.v. Gouzenko, The Iron Curtain).

U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. <u>Testimony of Former Russian Code Clerk Relating to the Internal Security of the United States</u>. 4 January 1954. pp. 1-67. This is the testimony of Igor Gouzenko, taken by the Subcommittee in Canada.

CANADA. ROYAL COMMISSION ON SECURITY. Report of the Royal Commission on Security (Abridged). Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1969. Bibl. 159 p. No index.

A Royal Commission was established to study security and intelligence procedures in the Canadian Government, especially including the secrecy of sources of information and the security of information provided Canada by

other nations. The report includes sections on organization for security, privacy, and individual, physical and industrial security. The Report has been slightly abridged for publication for security reasons but is still a worthwhile study.

CASTRO-HIDALGO, Orlando. Spy for Fidel. Miami, Fla.: E. A. Seeman Publishing, 1971. 110 p. No index.

A high ranking intelligence officer who defected from Castro's Cuba relates his experiences as a police officer, soldier, and intelligence officer with the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI). Serving in Paris at the time of his defection in 1969, he describes the use of the Cuban diplomatic service by Cuban intelligence agencies, as well as its organization and modus operandi. A useful book on the Cuban service.

U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. <u>Hearings</u>. Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean (Testimony of Orlando Castro Hidalgo). 16 October 1969. pp. 1423-1457.

CAVE BROWN, Anthony. <u>Bodyguard of Lies</u>. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. Sources and bibl. notes. Bibl. 947 p. (pap.: N.Y.: Bantam, 1976).

The author, a British journalist, has made an attempt to detail the story of Allied deception operations in World War II. His sources include declassified documents and personal interviews. The book is so replete with errors and erroneous embellishments, as well as irrelevancies and side excursions into matters far afield from deception, as to render it approachable only with great caution. Knowledgeable British reviewers have been highly critical, one noting that this book "can be enjoyed as narrative, as history it cannot be trusted."

CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES. <u>The Abuses of the Intelligence Agencies</u>. Washington: Center for National Security Studies, 1975. Bibl. footnotes. Bibl. 185 p. No index.

STATE OF STA

This is a report edited by Jerry J. Berman and Morton H. Halperin and compiled by members of the Center. It was prepared as a "factual summary" for the Conference on Controlling the Intelligence Agencies held in November 1975 under the auspices of liberal to left-wing groups. Agencies covered in the report include the FBI, Military Intelligence, NSA, the Secret Service, IRS, and CIA. It is based on articles in the media, and reports and hearings on these "abuses" by various committees, with a distinct "new left" orientation.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Counterintelligence Staff. The Rote Kapelle: The CIA's History of Soviet Intelligence and Espionage Networks in Western Europe, 1936-1945. Washington: University Publications of America, Inc., 1979. 390 p. No index.

The Rote Kapelle comprised certain Soviet intelligence networks in Western Europe during World War II. Many members of these nets had been active for Soviet intelligence in Europe for some years before the war. In the war years, they were perhaps one of the principal Soviet sources of strategic military intelligence on Germany through the use of what were apparently extremely successful penetrations of the German armed forces and high command. This book is perhaps the most authoritative work on the Rote Kapelle (including the Rote Drei based in Switzerland). It comprises three major parts: A narrative history of Rote Kapelle; a part on its modus operandi; and over one hundred pages of biographical sketches of the principal participants. This book is not easy reading, for it is essentially a staff study (released under a Freedom of Information Act request). This does not dilute its importance for specialists in, and students of, Soviet intelligence.

* CHAMBERS, Whittaker. <u>Witness</u>. New York: Random House, 1952. 808 p. (pap. Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1978).

This beautifully written autobiography, described by one knowledgeable reviewer as "remarkable in its timelessness," is a classic of its kind. Chambers relates how, disillusioned on many counts while still a student at Columbia University, he embraced Communism in 1925, becoming a member of CPUSA and "a paid functionary of the party." Eventually he was attached to an underground communist cell in Washington which was an American apparat under Soviet direction, with which Chambers engaged in espionage activities. This book supplies an interesting account of Soviet clandestine operations with such cells. Chambers broke from communism in 1938, becoming, in the 1940's, a senior editor of Time magazine. The last third of this book, starting in 1948, deals with Chambers' congressional and court testimony in which he named a former senior State Department official, Alger Hiss, as an active member of the communist underground cell to which Chambers had been attached. Hiss' denials and their confrontation ultimately led to Hiss suing Chambers for libel and the latter revealing the famous "pumpkin papers" - copies of confidential State Department material which Hiss, as an agent, had given Chambers for their Soviet control, while serving in the underground. Ultimately, Hiss was indicted for perjury, convicted and imprisoned. In awarding the Presidential Medal of Freedom posthumously to Chambers in March 1984, President Reagan cited him as a "writer of moving, majestic prose" and also took note of the Hiss-Chambers case as "a controversy in which the solitary figure of Whittaker Chambers personified the mystery of human redemption in the face of evil and suffering." Witness is Chambers' monument. (The most detailed current account of the Hiss-Chambers case is Perjury by Allen Weinstein, q.v.).

CHANDLER, Lt. Col. Stedman and Col. Robert W. Robb. Front Line Intelligence. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946. 183 p.

Although outdated, a readable primer to prepare officers to be combat "2's."

CLARK, Keith C. and Lawrence J. Legere, eds. The President and the Management of National Security: A Report by the Institute for Defense Analyses. New York: Praeger, 1969. Bibl. 274 p.

Originally an Institute for Defense Analyses report, this book provides one of the better analyses of the U.S. national security organization prior to the Nixon Administration. In discussing the decision-making process, foreign and domestic influences, intelligence, and the roles of the White House, State Department, and Defense Department, the report conveys the flavor and dynamics of the national security process and permits the serious intelligence officer to analyze his role to determine how intelligence can better support the overall effort.

CLAYTON, Aileen. The Enemy is Listening. London: Hutchinson, 1980. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 381 p. (pap. N.Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1982).

The author was assigned to the RAF's Y service in 1940, serving in England during the Battle of Britain, on Malta when it was under persistant attack, and in the North African and Italian campaigns. Mrs. Clayton was the first woman to be commissioned by the RAF in intelligence work; the first woman to be decorated for that work; and served as Chief Signals Intelligence Officer at the Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. This is the first book to be wholly devoted to the work of the Y service (although only to that part of the service handled by the RAF; the Y service story of the British Army and Navy, and that of the Americans, has not yet been told). The actual monitoring of all German signals, whether in high grade or low grade cypher, radio telephony, voice or other types of transmissions, was the responsibility of the Y service. The intercepts were flashed to Bletchley Park (for high grade cyphers) and other centers in England (for lower grade cyphers) for decryption. The Y service intercepts of voice and prolific lower grade cypher (exploitable when the key for the day was quickly broken in England) were of major importance for immediate daily tactical uses in the field. This autobiographical, sometimes chatty, volume is important in explaining the complex nature of the work undertaken and, above all, its major contribution to the winning of World War II.

* CLINE, Ray S. The CIA: Reality vs. Myth. Washington: Acropolis Books Ltd., 1982. Charts. Bibl. notes. 351 p. (pap.).

This edition includes virtually all of Dr. Cline's earlier estimable book. Secrets Spies and Scholars (1976), as did the revised edition, entitled The CIA Under Reagan Bush & Casey (1981). The present edition was to have been revised and updated further in some forty places in the text, but, for publishing reasons, this text does not include any revisions after p. 22, using only the text of the 1981 edition, with the title changed. The author was a senior intelligence analyst in OSS and CIA, rising, in the latter organization, to the position of Deputy Director for Intelligence. He also served as CIA's Chief of Station in two important posts overseas. From 1969-73, Dr. Cline headed the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. This remains (1985) the most important recent book by a U.S. official the major portion of whose career was spent in intelligence production and analysis and who writes of these matters with authority, understanding, and clarity. In the 1981 edition, (and included in this one), Dr. Cline adds material not in the 1976 edition, covering Carter/Mondale changes, the battles over proposed legislation, and the "Reagan Agenda." Unfortunately, the book does not include President Reagan's Executive Orders on Intelligence, although it briefly describes some of the attacks, particularly Congressional, on Mr. Casey as Director of Central Intelligence.

COBBAN, Alfred. Ambassadors and Secret Agents: The Diplomacy of the First Earl of Malmesbury at the Hague. London: Jonathan Cape, 1954. Bibl. references. Bibl. 255 p.

An excellent historical (but readable) account of British and French intrigue during a revolution in Holland in the 1780's. The book deals with aspects of agent handling, secret communications, double agents, and other elements of intelligence tradecraft, and the role of intelligence in the diplomatic maneuvers taking place in Holland at that time.

COLBY, William E. and Peter Forbath. Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978. 493 p.

This book describes Colby's intelligence career, commencing with his assignments to OSS in World War II when he parachuted behind the lines on hazardous missions in France and Norway. He then details his CIA career in which he rose from case officer and other assignments to become Intelligence during its most troubled Director of Central controversial times in the mid 70's--the aftermath of Watergate, and the Congressional hearings into alleged misdeeds by CIA and the Intelligence Community. He also discusses his role as an Ambassador in Vietnam and the pacification and Phoenix programs there. This book fans the flames of controversy which engulfed Colby's Directorship, particularly as to his views on the role of intelligence in a democratic society and on certain aspects of intelligence methodology.

COLLIER, Richard. Ten Thousand Eyes. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1958. 320 p. No index. (pap. N.Y.: Pyramid Books, 1959, 1963).

A well written account of the French Resistance agent networks which, under the direction of Free French intelligence headquarters in London, secured vital intelligence information and plans of the beach and inland defenses of Hitler's Atlantic Wall.

* CONFERENCE ON BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN RESISTANCE (1939-1945). Proceedings of a Conference on Britain and European Resistance 1939-1945: Organized by St. Antony's College, Oxford. Oxford: St. Antony's College, 1963. No index.

This volume contains the formal papers and the discussions of the Conference held at Oxford in December 1962. The Conference was designed primarily to explore British attitudes and contributions to the Resistance in the various countries of Europe during World War II. The papers were prepared by distinguished scholars and participants in Resistance activities both from Great Britain and the countries involved. An important work, it is perhaps the best compendium of its kind in this field, although, unfortunately, it was issued in an edition of less than 100 copies and is therefore hard to find.

CONQUEST, Robert. The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties. New York: Macmillan, 1968. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 633 p. (Revised pap., Middlesex, England: Pelican Books, 1971).

An invaluable study of the Soviet purges of the 1930's by one of the most respected and objective British students of the USSR. Of particular intelligence interest is the well-documented coverage of the role played by the Soviet intelligence and security services during Stalin's period of massive repression.

CONQUEST, Robert. The Soviet Police System. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Bibl. notes (at end of each chapter). Bibl. No index. 103 p.

The author is a highly regarded British writer on Soviet affairs, including intelligence. This dispassionate, slim, very useful volume is devoted to a survey of the domestic aspects of Soviet intelligence from the founding of the Cheka in 1917 to the KGB in 1960. It covers the Soviet police forces, including their use for repression, border guards and guard troops, extra-legal functions and forced labor, and other KGB internal operations by which control is maintained within the USSR. Regrettably, the book is now dated, although many of the KGB functions described are still carried on.

* CONSTANTINIDES, George C. <u>Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography</u>. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983. 559 p.

This is the best annotated bibliography on the literature of intelligence service currently available commercially. It is arguably the most important work of its kind ever produced for the public on this subject. Comprising over 500 titles, this volume includes annotations on what the author regards as "the majority of the more important [books] available in English." Its value lies in the annotations for each title, - some a half a page long, a few as long as two pages - a distillation of a guarter of a century of reading in this field by Constantinides, who is a thoroughgoing professional in national security matters. This book, together with the Scholar's Guide to Intelligence Literature, (q.v. p. 65 below), should be within arm's reach of every intelligence professional, as well as those who teach the subject in academe, and those who read this literature for their own interest. For those who have no other means to check on the validity of the contents of the books included, this bibliography is an essential tool. Helpfully, it also includes Intelligence Category, Title, Subject and Author indices. The Annotations are arranged alphabetically by author.

* CRAWLEY, Aidan Merivale. Escape from Germany: A History of R.A.F. Escapes During the War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956. 291 p. No index.

This is a sanitized version of an official history prepared by Crawley for the British Air Ministry. The book describes the British escape intelligence organizations (one of which the author headed) in German POW camps and the R.A.F. prisoners' continual efforts, successful and unsuccessful, to escape from these camps within Germany itself during World War II. A major work in the literature of evasion and escape. The full text of this official history is now published (London: HMSO, 1985).

CRUICKSHANK, Charles G. <u>Deception In World War II</u>. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. 248 p.

As an outline of British and American deception operations in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East in World War II, this book is useful and well-written. Cruickshank has arranged his material in a manner that is accessible and, considering the subject, very Unfortunately, the author does not use any of the available Axis sources to determine the effectiveness of the operations, but relies on the Allies' own appraisal of their success or failure. Nevertheless, the book should prove interesting and informative to both the experienced and the novice, as long as they realize that it is by no means the last word on the subject.

DALLIN, David J. <u>Soviet Espionage</u>. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955. Bibl. notes. 558 p.

An authoritative source on Soviet espionage operations and systems, the book provides one of the most comprehensive treatments of the subject. It is limited, however, to the period prior to the mid-fifties. The book is organized in a chronological format--first the main pre-WWII and wartime targets of Soviet espionage are discussed: France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and Holland. Next comes the postwar era and the emergence of the United States as the "main enemy" and target, the role of Soviet satellite countries in intelligence/reconnaissance operations, and discussion of espionage activities in Central Europe.

DANIEL, Donald C. and Katherine L. Herbig, eds. Strategic Military Deception. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982. Bibl. notes (at end of chapters). 378 p.

This volume is a compilation of studies by various authors who formed a multidisciplinary "Deception Working Group" at the Naval Postgraduate School. Part I comprises papers on the theory of strategic military deception. Part II papers test the validity of these theories in case studies from World War II through the Yom Kippur War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Two chapters deal with cases of Chinese military deception. This book is for the serious student who is willing to consider the theoretical approach and apply it to actual factual case presentations, with a view to use in future deception operations.

* DEAKIN, Frederick William and G. Richard Storry. <u>The Case of Richard Sorge</u>. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. Bibl. notes. <u>Bibl</u>. 373 p.

Based on documents and interviews, this is an account of a leading Soviet agent in China and Japan prior to and during early WWII, written by two distinguished Oxford scholars. According to Allen Dulles, "the most authoritative book on one of the greatest spy rings in modern history."

DELMER, Sefton. The Counterfeit Spy. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. 256 p.

A revealing treatment of the use of deception and double agents by the British in WWII, but not in a class with Masterman's <u>Double-Cross System</u> (q.v.). Delmer concentrates on the Spaniard who created a bogus network under Double-Cross which provided large amounts of deceptive intelligence to the Germans. This agent's operations contributed significantly to the Allied deception program for the Normandy invasion. The book contains some confusing and factual errors.

- DELZELL, Charles F. <u>Mussolini's Enemies: The Italian Anti-Fascist</u>
 Resistance. New York: Howard Fertig, 1974. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 670 p.
 - Part I of this scholarly work traces the clandestine Italian political opposition to Mussolini from 1924 to 1943; Part II describes the Partisan Resistance in Italy from 1943 to the end of the war.
- * DERIABIN, Peter and Frank Gibney. The Secret World. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1959. 334 p. (pap. N.Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1982).

This important work is one of the best available expositions on KGB operations, organizations, and functioning. The author was a Major in the KGB when he defected from his post in Vienna on 15 February 1954. This book and other writings by the author contain descriptions of his experiences during 12 years of service in the KGB. The Secret World stands as the definitive account of the KGB's organizational biography as known by the author during his years of service in Soviet state security. The book is rich with important detail, and is highly recommended as the source of such information for the period of the 1940's through the mid-1950's.

- U.S. CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES. <u>Hearing.</u>
 The Kremlin's Espionage and Terror Organizations. <u>Testimony of Peter S.</u>
 Deriabin. Released 17 March 1959. pp. 1-16.
- U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. <u>Hearing.</u> Communist Controls On Religious Activity. <u>Testimony of Petr S. Deriabin.</u> 5 May 1959. pp. 1-34.
- U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. <u>Hearing</u>. <u>Murder International Inc.</u>: <u>Murder and Kidnapping as an Instrument of Soviet Policy</u>. <u>Testimony of Petr S. Deriabin</u>. 26 March 1965. pp. 1-176.
- * DERIABIN, Peter. Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1972. Bibl. 448 p. (A revised and updated 2nd edition: Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1984).

Deriabin, author of <u>The Secret World</u> (q.v.) and editor-translator of <u>The Penkovskiy Papers</u> (q.v.), was a Soviet counterintelligence officer and bodyguard until his defection in 1954. Drawing on his personal experiences and numerous Russian and Western sources, he traces the history of a unique system of internal security from Kievan Rus to the Soviet Union of the 1970's. Deriabin shows how the bodyguard system, (still called the "Okhrana") within the KGB and its predecessors, has

been used as an instrument of terror against both the general populace and the Party apparatus itself. Providing unusual insights into the structure and workings of the various echelons of the Soviet security services, Deriabin also presents credible accounts of incidents seldom found in open sources: assassination attempts against Stalin, details of the arrest of Beria and his lieutenants, and KGB insubordination during Khrushchev's reign, among others. A substantial appendix gives details on such items as "Okhrana" organization, pay scales, training, the Kremlin Kommandatura, secrecy requirements and penalties.

DE SILVA, Peer. <u>Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence</u>. New York: New York Times Book Co., 1978. 308 p.

De Silva joined SSU (the operational remainder of OSS) in 1945 and continued his intelligence career in CIA, from which he retired in 1973. This memoir recounts his life as a senior officer of CIA's Clandestine Service both in Europe and the Far East. Much of his time overseas was spent as Chief of Station in the countries to which he was assigned, including Vietnam (1964-65) where a terrorist bomb cost him the sight of one eye. Sub Rosa never deviates from De Silva's view of the essentiality of a strong intelligence service for America. It tries to tell how the CIA works, particularly abroad, although the book suffers from the author's garrulous details of his personal life which do not add much to his tale. However, whatever its shortcomings, Sub Rosa is a memoir which brings out the flavor of an intelligence career and is written with a point of view that warrants study and attention.

DONOVAN, James B. <u>Strangers on a Bridge: The Case of Colonel Abel</u>. New York: Atheneum, 1964. Foreword by Judge Charles S. Desmond. 432 p. (pap. N.Y.: Popular Library, 1964).

Donovan, former General Counsel of OSS and the court-appointed lawyer for the Soviet "illegal," Rudolph Abel, and who also negotiated the exchange of Abel for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, has written an interesting and valuable book on his experiences with the Soviet espionage agent. Of particular interest are the few insights provided into the activities and motivations of this remarkable agent, the account of Abel's legal defense from arrest to final appeal, and Donovan's negotiations in East Berlin for the exchange of Abel for Powers. The reader may want to contrast this situation with the legal assistance and rights accorded Powers in his Moscow trial (q.v. Powers, Operation Overflight).

DORWART, Jeffery M. The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency 1865-1918. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1979. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 173 p.

ONI was organized in 1882 for the systematic collection of foreign naval information. Prior to that, any such collection for the Navy was pretty

much an individual or ad hor affair. Professor Dorwart has made a seemingly enhaustive search of outlished as well as unpublished archival material in writing than book, and he has carefully documented his facts. although some of his final conclusions are debatable. This is the first history published of this type on any of the U.S. military intelligence services other toan OSS. Dorwart's second volume, entitled <u>Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Mayy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945</u>, has now been published Annapolis, Maryland: Yaval Institute Press, 1983). Dorwart's view, the "Intelligence D.lemma" is ONI's roles in both positive and counter-intell decays that concentration by those officers involved in the latter interfered with the former which the author feels was ONI's "primary obligation." Thus, Borwart states, is the "central theme" of his volume. His purported inhaltance is not well supported, even though much of the peace-time work of the Naval District Intelligence Offices dealt with naval security patters. The issue improved by Dorwart's attempt to transfer the intelligence ministry of the post-Vielnam, time frame to the totally different processes between world Wart I and II in matters of counterintelligence.

* DULLES, Allen W. The Crart of Intelligence. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. Bibl. 277 b. (pap. N.V.: Signet Books, 1965).

SECURIOR DESCRIPTION SECURITY SECURITY DESCRIPTION

The former Director of Central Intelligence (1953-1961), after touching on some of the earlier history of intelligence, examines many aspects of intelligence requirements, collection, and production, describes the Communist intelligence services, and explores the uses of intelligence, particularly in relation to national security policy making. With the authority of his aim experience, he expounds the role of central intelligence and the Intelligence Community in the U.S. Government, up until the time he left office. (It should be noted that the paperback edition of this work has a little added material, particularly as to specific new cases.)

DULLES, Allen W. ed. <u>Great True Spy Stories</u>. New York: Harper and Row, 1963. 393 p. No index. (pap. N.Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1982).

One of the best-if but the best-inthologies of its kind, it comprises 39 selections covering such topins as espionage, counterespionage, double agents, deception operations. Codes and ciphens, and defection. Dulles' foreword and introductory numbers to each section are especially valuable in view of his extensive intelligence experience. Many of the items included were selected not only because of their pertinence, but also because they were not included in most other general spy anthologies by less knowledgeable editors.

DULLES, Allen W. The Secret Surrender. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. Bibl. 268 p. (pap. N.Y.: Popular Library, 1966).

Dulles, who directed the highly sensitive and successful OPERATION SUNRISE as the senior OSS official in Switzerland, describes this delicate 1945 operation which helped bring about the surrender of the German armies in Italy in World War II. The book constitutes a fascinating description of a unique intelligence coup at the highest level.

DVORNIK, Francis. Origins of Intelligence Services: The Ancient Near East, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, The Arab Muslim Empires, The Mongol Empire, China, Muscovy. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974. Bibl. at end of each chapter. 334 p.

The late Father Overnik, bern in Ozechoslovakia, a distinguished professor of history and political philosophies of ancient and medieval cultures, was associated with the Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine History (Harvard) in Washington. This scholarly work, begun in part for a postwar project initiated by General William J. Donovan as a private citizen, deals with the secret services of countries in the centuries before and after the birth of Christ. A unique work because of its total range over scholarly writings on these periods, it describes the early rudimentary efforts to establish intelligence collection and communications systems. An essential work for those interested in the origins of intelligence services in ancient times.

EL-AD, Avri with James Greech III. <u>Decline of Honor</u>. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1976. 364 p.

This is an account of the Lavon affair, a covert action operation by Israeli intelligence operatives in Egypt in the early 1950's. El-Ad, a member of the Israeli Military Intelligence Corps, was one of the participants in the operation which was designed to sabotage American and British installations in Egypt. By so doing, and making it appear that the Egyptians were responsible, the Israelis hoped to rupture the improving American relations with Egypt. The failure and ultimate exposure of the operation created government crises in Israel for some years.

ELLIS, Kenneth. The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century: A Study in Administrative History. London: Oxford University Press, 1958. Bibl. footnotes. 176 p.

The chapters on deciphering and the "secret office" of the 18th century British post office provide excellent insights into the long established practice of intercepting mail and into the deciphering of codes. One family had responsibility for official deciphering for over a century.

EPSTEIN, Edward Jay. Legent: The Coenct World of Lee Harvey Oswald. New York: Readen's Digest Press (McGraw-Hill), 1978. Source notes. 382 p.

This nighty controversial cook, the result of extensive research, presents the author's view of Oswalt as a possible on probable KSB agent in the assassination of President Fernedy. Extensive consideration is given to the possibility that certain Oswalt defectors to the West actually may have been disinformation agents to clear Oswalt of KSB taint. The bona fides of one of them, turn Nosenko, is still controversial in some intelligence circles. This how leaves more questions unanswered than it answers with respect to the assassination of the President.

FELIY. Christopher, useud. A inort Course in the Secret War. New York: Dutton, 1963. 314 p. No injex.

A seasoned intelligence citican discusses various aspects of covert action, clandestine collection, and intelligence tradecraft. The first half of this book is recommended. The second part deals with the author's intelligence experiences in Hungary after World War II.

FERGUSSON, Lt. Col. Thomas 6. <u>Smitish Military Intelligence</u>, 1870-1914: The Development of a Modern Intelligence Organization. Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1984. Bibl. notes (at end of each chapter). Bibl. 280 p.

Lt. Col. Fergusson, ONA, a West Point graduate, is a career military intelligence officer. This book was originally written as the author's PhD thesis at Duke University in 1981. It is a scholarly analysis of the evolution of the British strategic and tactical military intelligence establishment between the creation of the first Intelligence Branch in the War Office in 1873 and the First World War. Showing how this establishment grew out of the original Depot of Military Knowledge, a repository for plans and topographic information, which had a brief existence from 1803 to 1815, and its successor, the Topographical & Statistical Department, formed in 1855, Colonel Fergusson trace: British attempts to achieve a separate identity for military intelligence. Initially under the Adjutant General as the Intelligence Branch, then under the Quartermaster General, independent Directors of Military Intelligence, Major Generals Henry Brackenbury and (after a five year interim) his successor, John Ardah, functioned between 1887 and 1901. From 1901 to World War I, military intelligence was again subordinated, in this case to directors general of mobilization or operations. The author the contributions of the various directors of follows military intelligence and of field intelligence during the period, showing the uncertain role played by intelligence in the South African (Boer) War and in Britain's preparations for World War I. This first scholarly history of a modern military intelligence department to be published in the United States is an excellent reference source, well annotated and indexed, with an extensive bibliography.

* FISCHE, Edw. 1. The Muthol by of Civil wan Intellinement in: <u>Civil Wan</u> <u>History</u>. 1. 1. University of Towa, Den. 1964.

In the only decorate and in to be oncluded in talk diplingraphy, Mr. Excibely, an existence specialist in his field, attempts to shatter the symmetry of the lover freater and perpetuated concerning Civil War intelligence and selections. His comments serve as an invaluable starting mainton of the mass of Civil War of liber excitors and and more critical reading of the mass of Civil War of liber excitors and the control of which is hardly credible. (This issue of Civil with a non-civil war intelligence extractly of informations assets and talle on pensons whitten by, or ghosted for the intelligence extractly of year exerts of varying degrees of variabity. "Companions of Inciling the ontil Davis."

Filter, a more than a control of the Sthem. I satura Hills, California: Aeres Park Process, 1971. 2 vols., 305 + 45 p.

The two first advises largely been reconstructed from memory and notes to the interest and important work on German cryptography in European continues to would wan I through World Wan II, it has long been held by the interest on a classified basis and is now published for the first time. Flicke's twenty eight years in the German cryptographic service of ered poth wars, and is of particular importance in the interest test. However, there are a few natters in these volumes where Flicke's recornect or his information is incomplete. It should also be enter that the material in Vol. II has been somewhat abridged by the education.

FOOT, Michael Painard Daniell. Resistance: European Resistance to Nazism 1940-1945. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1977. Bibl. footnotes. Note on broke. 46::

In the authoris own words, this book attempts "to analyse the whole field of warties resistance to the Nazis in Europe; to explain what kinds of the is resisters could and could not do...". To compress this broad subject for one value means that it must be treated with some degree of superfisely my and absence of detail. And therein lies the book's merit; for it is now as a primer or introduction to the subject of resistance in Werld War II lamage, including the roles of SOE and OSS. The first number and fifty dages are especially recommended; the country by country survey, which commise the second half of the book, do contain some factual errors.

FOOT, Michael Richard Daniell. <u>SOE: An outline history of the Special</u> Operations Executive 1940-46. London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1984. Bibl. notes. 280 p.

This is a lean, well written book by the well-known British historian. Michael Foot. The first 171 pages give a useful overview of SOE: what it was and how it began; its key senior personnel; its role in the war effort (in Churchill's phrase to "set Europe ablaze" through work with the indigenous resistance movements in Europe, as well as by subversion and sabotage); its security and some penetration by the enemy; its methods. About 75 pages of the book are given over to terse accounts of SOE operations from Abyssinia, through Europe, the Balkans, and the Far East. For those searching for details of these operations, one must look to the many personal memoirs which participants have now written. Foot concludes with a short assessment of SOE's work: not that it won the war by itself, although in a few instances its work was critical. In some cases, crack Axis front-line troops had to be diverted to try to protect their rear areas from sabotage. SOE was often able to strengthen the backbone of the resisters in occupied countries both with leadership and supplies. returned self respect to many who were able to contribute by clandestine resistance in their occupied homelands.

* FOOT, Michael Richard Daniell. <u>SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944.</u> Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1984. Bibl. footnotes. Sources. Bibl. 550 p.

This volume is a part of the official British History of the Second World War series. The 1968 British edition is slightly changed from the original 1966 edition and is the text used in the U.S. edition. The book contains a short but useful section on the origins and nature of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) in its work of conducting sabotage and subversive resistance activities against the Axis in World War II. The book deals primarily with the work of the F Section -- SOE's independent French Section -- describing recruiting and training, communications, and security, as well as specific intelligence nets and operations. The author had access to some official SOE files in writing, as well as some contact with participants in these activities.

FOOT, Michael Richard Daniell and James M. Langley. MI 9: Escape and Evasion 1939-1945. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980. Bibl. 351 p.

This book, originally published in England in 1979, has been slightly expanded in the U.S. edition to give some material on the American MIS-X, the counterpart of the British escape and evasion organization, MI 9, in World War II. Langley, who escaped from German hands after the loss of an arm at Dunkirk, was the representative of MI 6 in MI 9. He ultimately was the co-commander of the joint American/British E & E task force, IS 9, on the continent following D-Day. Foot is a well known British historian.

MI 9 oversaw the establishment of escape lines, the preparation of escape kits, and the instructions for troops and fliers as to how to evade capture if possible, how to conduct oneself if captured, and how to undertake escape if imprisoned. It also found the means to be in communication with some of the prisoners in enemy camps. The book, written from the viewpoint of MI 9 headquarters, includes the intelligence perspectives of E & E, and describes the work of some of the major E & E nets, (the "rat lines"), in various theaters of World War II. It is the first book to describe the work of the Americans in this field, although in nowhere near the detail given to the British work which preceded it. Nevertheless, it is an important work, and one which sets the path for an overall study of American activities in this field in World War II.

FOOTE, Alexander. Handbook for Spies. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1949. 273 p. No index. (Revised edition: London: Museum Press, 1964).

A description of the Soviet espionage net, Rote Drei, in Switzerland during WWII, written by a British radio operator in this Soviet apparat. An interesting early study at the time of its original publication, other writings have now caught up with some of Foote's errors and distortions. (In particular q.v., p. 17, CIA, The Rote Kapelle).

FORD, Corey. <u>Donovan of OSS</u>. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970. Bibl. 366 p.

This book is both a biography of Donovan and a history of the Office of Strategic Service (OSS) which he headed. Based in part on some of Donovan's own private papers, it sheds much light on the leader of U.S. WWII intelligence and on the predecessor organization to CIA. However, many sources were not exploited, and the definitive biography of Donovan is yet to be written. Since Ford's biography was published, two others have appeared in 1982: Dunlop's Donovan and Cave Brown's Wild Bill Donovan. Both books have such shortcomings that they have not been included in this Bibliography.

FREEDMAN, Lawrence. <u>US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat.</u>
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 235 p.

The author is a British researcher and writer in the field of strategic studies. This volume sets forth his understanding of the U.S. Intelligence Community and its estimating process. It then discusses various aspects of the "Soviet threat" from the early "missile gap" through the Ford administration. Freedman has relied almost completely on open sources - books, articles, declassified materials, and some interviews. He correctly notes in his introduction that "I cannot be sure as to the reliability of all the information I have used . . . In a study such as this there are bound to be inaccuracies." Some of his published sources are indeed rather weak reeds on which to lean. Nevertheless, this

book is an interesting effort by an outsider and worth a look by those interested in this field.

FROLIK, Josef. The Frolik Defection. London: Leo Cooper, 1975. 184 p.

These memoirs of a Czech intelligence officer, a Major who defected in 1969, are an important guide to the day-to-day operations of Bloc intelligence agents. Frolik includes some details of poisoning and bombing attempts against Radio Free Europe, entrapment of visitors to his country, recruitment of members of the British Parliament, and development of certain British labor leaders as sources. In the latter case, he was ordered to desist, because some labor officials were already in the KGB's "stable." Unsettling to American readers is Frolik's comment that when he first considered defection and reviewed his service's files on U.S. intelligence officers, looking for one to contact, he ended up compiling a list of those officers to whom he would not defect based on their weaknesses and vulnerabilities as alleged in his official files. The book does not include the names of the recruited labor and parliamentary leaders because of the British libel laws.

U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. Hearing. Communist Bloc Intelligence Activities in the United States. (Testimony of Josef Frolik) 18 November 1975. pp. 1-64.

GEHLEN, Reinhard. The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen. New York: World Publishing, 1972. Introduction by George Bailey. 386 p. No index. (pap. N.Y.: Popular Library, 1973).

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General Gehlen was the senior German intelligence officer on the Eastern Front during WWII. After the war, he established the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) - the German foreign intelligence service. The Gehlen Memoirs have many of the usual attributes of an intelligence service chief's personal recollections: self-serving to highlight his successes and rationalize his shortcomings; more lengthy coverage of his early successes and relatively cursory on his failures (i.e. the Felfe case); and an absence of "inside" information due to security limitations, the threat of possible libel suits, or the natural guardedness of a lifetime intelligence practitioner. Yet, as the memoirs of an intelligence leader of the Cold War period, the book contains much of value to the discriminating reader, although in general it is considered disappointing. (q.v. Höhne and Zolling, The General Was a Spy).

GISKES, Herman J. <u>London Calling North Pole</u>. New York: British Book Centre, 1953. Epilogue by H. M. G. Lauwers. 208 p. No index. (pap. N.Y.: Bantam Books, 1982).

This book relates the remarkable operation known as "Nordpol" or the "Englandspiel." It is the story of the radio play-back and deception set up by the Germans in World War II after their capture of a Dutch officer parachuted into Holland by the British SOE to work with the Resistance. Undetected for nearly two years, the operation netted 54 agents and quantities of British weapons and explosives parachuted to the Dutch Resistance during that time. Basically, "Nordpol" was a German tactical success rather than a strategic one. The book also contains material on other operations of the Abwehr's counterintelligence branch, of which the author was chief in Holland. (For additional reading on "Nordpol", see Louis De Jong's "The 'Great Game' of Secret Agents" in Encounter, Jan. 1980. De Jong is the leading Dutch historian on World War II activities of and in the Netherlands, including the Resistance).

GLASS, Lt. Col. Robert R. and Lt. Col. Phillip B. Davidson. <u>Intelligence Is</u> for <u>Commanders</u>. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publ. Co., 1948. Foreword by Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy. 189 p.

A primer on combat intelligence including basic principles, the intelligence cycle, tactical study of the terrain and weather, counterintelligence training, and SOP's. Although basic, fundamental, and somewhat outdated, the book nevertheless has valuable insights into the critical relationship between the commander and his intelligence officer.

GODDARD, <u>Brig. Gen.</u> George W. <u>with DeWitt S. Copp. Overview: A Life-Long Adventure in Aerial Photography.</u> Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1969. 415 p.

Personal account of the development of aerial photography for military purposes from the 1920's through the 1940's by the pioneer of long-range high altitude photography and the developer of the strip camera. As engaging as it is informative, unfortunately the book does not provide a satisfactory discussion of the intelligence application of Goddard's technology.

GODSON, Roy, ed. Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's.

See: NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER.

BALLIAN PROPERTY AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT PROPERTY OF

GOLITSYN, Anatoliy. New Lies for Old: The Communist Strategy of Deception and Disinformation. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1984. Bibl. notes. 412 p.

Golitsyn joined the Soviet State Security Service (now the KGB) in 1946, and served in increasingly important positions until he defected from his post in Finland in December 1961. Now an American citizen, Golitsyn brought much valuable information with him concerning Soviet agents in the West as well as on Soviet uses and techniques of disinformation to mask its over all politico-military strategies. While considered by some to be the "most valuable defector ever to reach the West," Golitsyn has been a controversial figure for many years as he developed his views on alleged Soviet penetrations, as well as on foreign policy and strategy. The present book contains some valuable material on Soviet intelligence, but it focuses mainly on what he thinks are major Soviet disinformation operations and the role of the KGB in that work. Golitsyn feels that these Soviet operations were in large measure given little heed by the West, which was often taken in by them. Thus this volume fans the controversies which surround Golitsyn's own views. The book is more solid when the author considers activities that are within his own KGB career span, rather than when he deals with his personal speculation and opinion.

GOOCH, John and Amos Perlmutter, eds. Military Deception and Strategic Surprise. Totowa, New Jersey: Frank Cass, 1982. Bibl. notes (at end of chapters). 192 p. No index.

This is an anthology of writings on military deception and strategic surprise by six authors. Three of the chapters consider the subject in the light of specific cases: German covert rearmament, 1919-1939; Soviet deception on nuclear missile development, 1955-1981; and the Egyptian/Israeli confrontation, 1971-1973. A chapter is included on "Intelligence and Deception", and two chapters are theoretical studies.

GOUDSMIT, Samuel A. ALSOS. New York: Henry Schuman, Inc., 1947. 259 p.

An interesting and worthwhile look at a scientific intelligence project: the determination of how much the Germans knew of our atom bomb and the extent of German progress in making one in World War II. The study was conducted by a joint scientific-military team that followed in the wake of the Allied armies invading Europe in 1944. Dr. Goudsmit was the leader of the civilian scientists in this joint effort. One of the few books in the scientific and technical intelligence field. (q.v. Pash, The ALSOS Mission).

GOULDEN, Joseph C. with Alexander W. Raffio. The Death Merchant: The Rise and Fall of Edwin P. Wilson. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. 455 p.

Edwin Wilson was a CIA contract agent - never a staff employee -commencing in 1955. His contract was not renewed, for cause, in 1971. From 1971-1976, he was a contract employee of Task Force 157, Office of Naval Intelligence; again his contract was not renewed. Following his termination from all U.S. intelligence activities in 1976, Wilson formed his own companies, largely for illicit arms dealings with Libya; supplying the Libyans with weapons and explosives, (the latter for terrorist and bringing Americans to assist in training Libyan activities). intelligence personnel in the use of this weaponry. In 1982, Wilson was brought back to the United States, through a ruse, to face indictments and He was convicted three times: for illegal arms smuggling; for smuggling 20 tons of C-4 explosives from the U.S.; and for the so-called "hit-list" case, when Wilson plotted in prison to attempt to have his "enemies", including two U.S. prosecutors, murdered. For all these violations of U.S. statutes, Wilson received sentences totalling fifty two years. The Death Merchant is a well written, carefully researched account of these matters. Goulden has relied, in great measure, on interviews with some of Wilson's former associates who seemed willing to talk to Goulden factually and at length. This book on the Wilson case is included in this Bibliography because of the public outcry the case caused at a time when the ethics of the intelligence profession were being much discussed in the media and elsewhere. There were demands that the intelligence community keep a watchful eye on the activities of its former personnel - generally a patent imposs sility for many reasons including their large number. In the end, what the Wilson case demonstrated is that there are ample laws on the U.S. statute books to convict a former intelligence officer turned criminal, and that special new statutory provisions to cover such situations were both impractical and unnecessary.

GOULDEN, Joseph C. Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair-Illusion and Reality. New York: Rand McNally, 1969. Bibl. sources. 285 p.

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Of specific interest in this study of the Gulf of Tonkin affair during the Vietnamese War is the chapter on "The Dangerous Business of Electronic Espionage."

GOUZENKO, Igor. The Iron Curtain. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1948. 279 p. No index.

The account by the Russian GRU code clerk (who defected from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa) regarding Soviet espionage, and particularly atomic espionage, in Canada immediately after WWII. (q.v. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission...).

- U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. <u>Hearing</u>. Testimony of Former Russian Code Clerk Relating to the Internal Security of the United States. 11 January 1955. pp. 1-67.
- GRAMONT, Sanche de. The Secret War: The Story of International Espionage Since World War II. New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1962. 515 p. (pap. N.Y.: Dell, 1963).
 - A journalist's study of CIA and foreign intelligence organizations conducting secret espionage activities in the 1950's. The book is considered worth reading, particularly for the case studies involved.
- HAGEN, Louis E. The Secret War for Europe: A Dossier of Espionage. New York: Stein and Day, 1969. Foreword by Sir Kenneth Strong. 287 p.

A well-recommended book on post-WWII espionage activities in Germany, with discussions of both West and East German espionage operations which convey the nature of the secret clandestine war between competing intelligence services.

HAMILTON, Peter. <u>Espionage and Subversion in an Industrial Society: An Examination and Philosophy of Defense for Management</u>. London: Hutchinson, 1967. Bibl. 230 p.

A provocative and highly interesting conceptualization of the role of industrial espionage and subversion in the "modern battlefield of the industrial arena, where nations and ideologies struggle for economic supremacy." For the students of intelligence theory and practice, the book will convey some new insights and outlooks in a continuing, important battlefield.

HAREL, Isser. The House on Garibaldi Street: The First Full Account of the Capture of Adolf Eichmann, Told by the Former Head of Israel's Secret Service. New York: The Viking Press, 1975. 296 p. (pap. N.Y.: Bantam, 1976).

Isser Harel, former chief of the Israeli Service, MOSSAD, describes in detailed fashion the long-range, in-depth planning and operation for the Eichmann capture by Israeli agents in Argentina in 1960. Many elements of tradecraft are described. Unfortunately, little is done to identify the actual intelligence organizations involved, and the actual agents appear under pseudonyms. The book presents the concepts of Harel and men like him who, a generation ago, created the Israeli intelligence community and who continue to influence it even in retirement.

HEIKAL, Mohammed. The Road to Ramadan. New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Company, 1975. 285 p. (pap. N.Y.: Ballantine, 1976).

This book by Egypt's former Minister of Information and editor-in-chief of Al Ahram, Egypt's leading newspaper, covers the Arab "inside story" of Egyptian events from the Six Day War of 1967 through the Yom Kippur War of 1973. It is not solely an intelligence text. However, it is still an important book which details Arab thinking, as well as the planning, disinformation, deception, and intelligence activities by the Egyptian military, which misled Israeli military intelligence in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War.

HERZOG, <u>Major General</u> Chaim. <u>The War of Atonement: October 1973</u>. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975. 300 p.

This account of the 1973 Yom Kippur War is a professional analysis of Israeli intelligence failures. The author was the former Israeli Director of Military Intelligence.

HEUER, Richards J., Jr., ed. <u>Quantitative Approaches to Political Bibl. notes.</u> Intelligence: The CIA Experience. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978.

This book comprises a series of essays by CIA analysts to elucidate CIA's attempt "to apply modern social science methods to problems confronted by political intelligence analysts... The first chapter discusses the CIA's overall experience in applying quantitative methods of political analysis; seven subsequent chapters report on applications of specific methods as diverse as regression analysis, multi-dimensional scaling, Bayesian statistics, and cross-impact analysis." (Quoted from the book's prefatory material). The authors have attempted to avoid methodological jargon as much as possible so as to be understood by the informed layman.

HEYMONT, Lt. Col. Irving. <u>Combat Intelligence in Modern Warfare</u>. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Co., 1960. 244 p.

The author proposes to set forth comprehensively the principles and operations of combat intelligence, including a full explanation of the impact of nuclear weapons, helicopters, electronics, and other aspects of modern warfare. An ambitious effort, but with very few revealing conclusions or new ideas.

HILSMAN, Roger. Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956. 187 p.

Discussion of the relationship between intelligence and the decision process by a former OSS Officer written prior to his role as Director of

INR. This controversial academic study on the theory of intelligence is provocative, but not easy reading. Several of Hilsman's interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations are not accepted by leading intelligence authorities.

HILSMAN, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967. 602 p. (pap. N.Y.: Dell, 1968).

Hilsman, a former OSS Officer, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs under President Kennedy, writes on the "politics of foreign policy in the Kennedy Administration." Parts III and V on President Kennedy and the CIA and "The Cuban Missile Crisis" are of particular interest. Hilsman's comments are highly subjective and frequently very provocative and debatable. Even for those who disagree with the author, the book provides an insight into the intelligence activities of the critical years of the early 60's as viewed by the then Director, INR.

HINGLEY, Ronald. The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, Imperial Russian and Soviet Political Security Operations. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 313 p.

An historical survey of Russian and Soviet intelligence and security activities from Ivan the Terrible, in the 16th century, through the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime until 1970. Though he adds no new insights or interpretations, the author has made a significant contribution by portraying the continuity of secret police functions from the Tsarist through the Soviet periods. Well written, it provides good background reading for the person unfamiliar with the centuries-long tradition behind the KGB/GRU apparatus.

* HINSLEY, Francis H., with E. E. Thomas, C. F. G. Ransom and R. C. Knight.

British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 1981, 1984.

Appendices. Bibl. footnotes. (A bibl. covering all four vols. will be included in the last vol.) Vol. 1, 601 p.; Vol. 2, 850 p.; Vol. 3, Part I, 693 p.

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This monumental and scholarly work, arguably the most comprehensive officially authorized publication ever produced on intelligence, will be completed in four volumes (Vol. 3 being divided into two Parts). Vol. 1 takes readers to the German invasion of Russia in June 1941. Vol. 2 goes through the end of the campaigns in North Africa (and a short chapter on the war on the Eastern Front through the first half of 1943). Vol. 3, Part 1, largely covers the period June 1943 - June 1944, including chapters on Strategic Intelligence Assessments, and intelligence in the

Mediterranean Theatre, the war at sea, the air war, and on the V-Weapons. Vol. 3, Part 2, the concluding volume, will almost certainly not appear until late 1985 and will cover from D-Day through VE-Day. Originally published in London (HMSO), this entire work is a part of the official British series, History of the Second World War. Intended for the serious reader, this history is often heavy going, in part because of its minutiae; but it should be studied by all intelligence professionals, as well as by teachers and others interested in the subject; nor should the Appendices be overlooked, as they contain much valuable information. principal task of the authors is "to reconstruct the influence of intelligence on the major decisions, the chief operations and the general course of the war". Its coverage is largely on strategic intelligence, for much of the tactical intelligence documentation was destroyed at war's end. Nevertheless, the authors have had access to virtually all available strategic, and many operational, British intelligence documents of World War II (and the key years preceding), including the Ultra material. The first is that these volumes have possible drawbacks are noted. comparatively little on the war in the Pacific and Far East, because so much of that war was carried on by the United States that "it is not possible to provide an adequate account on the basis of the British archives alone". The second point is the almost total absence of the names of those who participated in the intelligence work described, although their organizations are named. The authors point out that the security of some names was still a factor; but, particularly because there were so many individuals involved in intelligence service, giving prominence to the names of a few would have been unfair to the many others unnamed.

HOHNE, Heinz. Codeword: Direktor: The Story of the Red Orchestra. New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1971. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 310 p. (pap. N.Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1982).

Heinz Hohne provides a new and provocative evaluation of the famous Soviet spy ring, the "Red Orchestra" or "Rote Kapelle." Well documented with organizational charts, glossary, extensive notes, personality data, and bibliography, the book presents a dramatic account of the confrontation between the Soviet ring and the Nazi counterespionage organization dedicated to its neutralization and destruction. Espionage, counterespionage, and controlled deception operations are described in sufficient detail to satisfy both the general reader and the professional intelligence officer. Noteworthy is the author's contention that both the Germans and the Russians (as well as other observers) have greatly exaggerated the impact of the ring on the course of the war. (q.v. Trepper, The Great Game, and Central Intelligence Agency, The Rote Kapelle).

HOHNE, Heinz and Herman Zolling. The General Was a Spy: The Truth About New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1972. Introduction by Hugh R. Trevor-Roper. Preface by Andrew Tully. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 347 p. (pap. N.Y.: Bantam Books, 1972).

Thic book is an interesting and well-documented treatment of General Gehlen's amazing intelligence career, capped by his directorship of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) - the German external service. Expanded from the authors' earlier series on Gehlen in the German magazine, Der Spiegel, it is a relatively objective description of Gehlen's career and his subsequent fall, although there are some errors in both facts and details. The authors' notes, bibliography, and operational data sprinkled throughout the book will be of particular interest to the serious student of the period. (q.v. Gehlen, The Service).

HOLMES, Wilfred J. <u>Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific during World War II</u>. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1979. Foreword by Senator Daniel K. Inouye. 231 p.

This personal account of the Navy's Hawaiian-based production of intelligence in support of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is both accurate and very readable. Capt. Holmes, USN, was an integral part of this work, including the communications intelligence support to CINCPAC. His role included all-source intelligence production, analysis, and dissemination. The author gives excellent descriptions of many of the key personnel involved. Particularly valuable are Holmes' account of the intelligence background of the crucial battle of Midway and the shoot-down of the plane carrying Admiral Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, a successful but calculated risk of the use of COMINT.

HOOD, William. Mole. New York: W. W. Norton, 1982. Fns. 317 p. (pap. N.Y.: Ballantine Books, 1983).

particularly author's long career in intellience and counterintelligence - spanned thirty years in OSS and CIA. describes the activities of Lt. Col. Pyotr Popov, a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) officer who served as a penetration agent-in-place for A walk-in in Vienna in 1952, Popov continued to supply high grade information on Soviet intelligence operations, organization, personalities both from Vienna and then, after his transfer, from East Germany until his arrest by the KGB in 1958. He was probably executed in This book makes an excellent contribution to operational 1959. intelligence training. It is replete with tradecraft, although it reads with the pace of good spy fiction.

* HYDE, H. Montgomery. Room 3603: The Story of the British Intelligence Center in New York during World War II. New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1963. Foreword by Ian Fleming. Bibl. (sources). 257 p. (pap. New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1964 and reissued, New York: Ballantine Books, 1977).

An anecdotal account, (excellent, as far as it goes), of British secret intelligence operations in the United States and the Western Hemisphere during World War II conducted by British Security Coordination (BSC). The author was a member of the staff of Sir William Stephenson, "Intrepid", the war-time Director of BSC. The book describes this organization's relationships with the FBI, the support it gave to General Donovan in establishing the OSS, and many BSC operations in intelligence collection, counterintelligence and covert action throughout the Western Hemisphere. Of special interest is what Hyde reveals of BSC's covert operations to mobilize American public opinion in favor of the Allies. Room 3603 is still the best book on Intrepid and BSC. (q.v. Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid. For further reading on the subject, see Hyde: Secret Intelligence Agent).

IND, Col. Allison. Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War Against Japan. New York: McKay, 1958. 305 p.

This is a description of combined U.S. and Allied clandestine intelligence collection operations conducted by some of General McArthur's intelligence organizations against the Japanese in the South and Southwest Pacific. It is written by the then Deputy Controller of the Allied Intelligence Bureau. This book is one of the few good sources available on this activity.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS.

<u>European Resistance Movements 1939-45: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the History of the Resistance Movements Held at Milan 26-29 March 1961. London: Pergamon Press, 1964. Introduction by Ferruccio Parri. 663 p.</u>

This volume contains the formal papers presented at the Conference by historians of and participants in the various WWII Resistance movements, both from the West, and Soviet Union and Bloc countries. From a reading of these papers, one will see that the Soviet and Bloc papers present a well-orchestrated propaganda theme: namely, that they did not use Resistance movements for military and intelligence purposes; that the people of the occupied countries knew that they would be liberated by the might of the Red Armies; and that therefore Resistance was a struggle by the people to make certain that the alleged fascist, monarchical leadership of pre-war times would never return to enslave the people for the political and economic purposes of the United States and Great Britain. These propaganda ploys were denounced by the Western scholars at the Conference, and for that reason none of the floor debates are included, as they were considered offensive by the Soviets! The Western

contributions present a more accurate historical balance. (For further study, see also the papers of the First International Conference on the History of the European Resistance Movements, held at Liege and Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; the papers of that Conference were published by the Pergamon Press in 1960. q.v. Conference on Britain and European Resistance containing the papers and discussions of the Conference held at Oxford, England, in 1962).

JAMES, Admiral Sir William. The Code Breakers of Room 40: The Story of Admiral Sir William Hall, Genius of British Counterintelligence. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956. 212 p.

This is a biography of Britain's Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Sir William "Blinker" Hall, during WWI, by the officer in charge of communications intelligence (Room 40) during part of the conflict. It includes an interesting description of the exploitation of the Zimmerman Telegram. The book was written too early to exploit some of the data now available, and Admiral Hall was never allowed to publish his autobiography. (Beesly, q.v., has written perhaps a more useful study in his Room 40, and he had access to Hall's papers).

JOHN, Otto. <u>Twice Through the Lines: The Autobiography of Otto John</u>. New York: Harper and Row, 1972. Bibl. 340 p.

These memoirs of the former head of West Germany's post-WWII internal security service shed new light from the author's self-serving point of view on the question of his "defection" or "kidnapping" to East Germany and his subsequent return to West Germany. John, a German liberal who opposed Hitler, assisted British intelligence in WWII, and later feuded with Gehlen in post-war Germany, relates his fascinating story in an interesting and readable manner. His comments on Germany and the German people are particularly revealing, although the general effect of the book leaves one unsatisfied as to its soundness. (q.v. Gehlen, The Service, for his criticism of John).

* JONES, R. V. The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence, 1939-1945.

New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1978. Foreword by the Vicomtesse de Clarens. Bibl. notes. 556 p.

This major, although autobiographical, book describes the author's experiences in World War II as the head of scientific intelligence on the British Air Staff and scientific intelligence advisor to the British Secret Intelligence Service, as well as his associations with senior British scientific personnel throughout the War. It is important reading about the development of scientific intelligence in Britain at war, including the use of Ultra materials in that effort. Of interest is the

author's emphasis on his use of POW interrogation reports, as well as photo reconaissance, captured documents, and agent reporting. Prof. Jones is often considered the "father" of scientific and technical intelligence.

* KAHN, David. The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing. New York: Macmillan, 1967. Bibl. notes. 1164 p. (pap N.Y.: Signet Books, 1973).

A history of secret communication from ancient times to the mid-1960's, it is still considered the most comprehensive work on the subject. The book provides both an historical survey of cryptology and considerable information on its science and methodology. Unfortunately it was written before the 1974 revelations concerning the British breaking of the German World War II ciphers, but this detracts only in small measure from the importance of this volume in the field. (The paperback edition, abridged by the author, comprises about the last third of the original text. For further reading, see the author's Kahn on Codes, a compilation of Kahn's writings and speeches on cryptology).

KAHN, David. <u>Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II.</u>
New York: Macmillan, 1978. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 671 p.

This is the most detailed, (but not comprehensive), study on the subject in English. The book is based on personal interviews with many participants and on extensive research of documentary material. Its focus is on German Army and high command intelligence, with little on air and naval intelligence. The book is particularly weak on German counterintelligence.

KAZNACHEEV, Aleksandr I. <u>Inside a Soviet Embassy: Experiences of a Russian Diplomat in Burma.</u> Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1962. Introduction by Simon Wolin. 250 p.

The experiences of a young U.S.S.R. diplomat co-opted into Soviet intelligence in Burma, who subsequently asked for asylum in the U.S. in 1959. This book provides a rare look into the operations of intelligence in a Soviet Embassy in combination with the Soviet diplomatic service, and into Soviet political activities, disinformation and other special activities in S.E. Asia, particularly vis-a-vis Communist China. The use of Embassy cover for the intelligence activities is well described.

- U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. Hearing. Soviet Intelligence in Asia. Testimony of Aleksandr Yurievich Kasnakheyev. 14 December 1959. pp. 1-25.
- U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. <u>Hearing.</u> Conditions In the Soviet Union. <u>The New Class</u>. <u>Further Testimony of Aleksandr Y. Kaznacheyev</u>. 22 January 1960. pp. 1-42.

* KENT, Sherman. <u>Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy</u>. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949. 226 p. (pap. Princeton University Press, 1966).

Although dated, but not obsolete, this is still a classic, foresighted early work of "wide and profound influence" (as one reviewer has described it), on the theory and ideal operation of national intelligence production. The book lays down many of the principles which have subsequently been established in practice. The 1966 paperback edition contains a new 5000 word preface by Dr. Kent, reflecting his many years of experience as Chairman of the Board of National Estimates at CIA. In this preface, Dr. Kent reconfirms his views on the importance of research and analysis in the production of substantive intelligence for national policy makers.

KHOKHLOV, Nikolai Y. <u>In the Name of Conscience: The Testament of a Soviet</u> Secret Agent. New York: David McKay Co., 1959. 363 p. No index.

An autobiographical account, this book describes the author's experiences as an MVD officer, from his recruitment in 1941 to his defection from Soviet state security in 1954. In that year, Khokhlov was sent to Germany to assassinate a prominent leader of the NTS (an anti-Soviet Russian emigré organization). On arriving in Germany, Khokhlov refused to carry out this execution, turned himself over to his target, and defected to U.S. intelligence officials. Along with valuable details about Soviet state security recruitment and operations, Khokhlov includes criticism of the way he was handled by U.S. intelligence officials.

- U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. Hearing. Activities of Soviet Secret Service. Testimony of Nikolai Eugeniyevich Khokhlov, Former MGB Agent. 21 May 1954. pp. 1-48.
- U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. Hearings. Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, Part 86. Testimony of Nikolai Khokhlov. 16 October 1957. p. 4817-4841.
- U.S. CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES. Hearing. Testimony of Nikolai Khokhlov: Thought Control in Soviet Art and the Liberation of Russia. (Investigation of Communist Activities in the Los Angeles, Calif. Area, Part 8). 17 April 1956. pp. 3755-3804.
- KIRKPATRICK, Lyman B., Jr. <u>Captains Without Eyes: Intelligence Failures in World War II</u>. New York: <u>Macmillan Co., 1969</u>. <u>Bibl. references</u>. <u>Bibl.</u> <u>303 p</u>.

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An OSS and CIA Officer, Kirkpatrick presents an interesting examination of five major intelligence "failures" of World War II, (<u>Barbarossa</u>, Pearl Harbor, Dieppe, Arnehm, Battle of the Bulge) with chapters on the problems of foresight and the brilliance of hindsight in such matters. Much of

what he has written is now more comprehensively presented by later declassified information.

* KIRKPATRICK, Lyman B., Jr. <u>The Real CIA</u>. New York: Macmillan Company, 1968. 312 p.

This interesting memoir describes the author's experiences in OSS and his long career in CIA, where he served in many positions, including those of Inspector General and Executive Director-Comptroller. It provides an insider's view of the development of CIA up until Kirkpatrick's retirement in 1965. Many things of importance are discussed, such as the Bay of Pigs, the G-2 clandestine collection organization and its shortcomings, the committee work which resulted in the establishment of DIA, CIA resistance to attacks by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, and the author's views on several DCI's. Contrary to what some reviewers have maintained, this book was not an "official" CIA apologia nor "officially" sponsored.

KIRKPATRICK, Lyman B., Jr. The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities. New York: Hill and Wang, 1973. Bibl. 212 p. (pap. N.Y.: Hill and Wang, 1975).

A description of the roles, functions, and organization of the U.S. Intelligence Community, prior to Prof. Kirkpatrick's retirement from CIA in 1965. The book is the best available for that period, but does not reflect the many changes in the Community since that date. Nevertheless, it is recommended reading for the period covered by an author in a unique position to comment as CIA's former Inspector General and Executive Director/Comptroller.

KLASS, Philip J. <u>Secret Sentries in Space</u>. New York: Random House, 1971. 236 p.

The senior avionics editor for "Aviation Week and Space Technology" magazine provides an interesting and informative discussion of the development and constant improvement of space satellites. Using open sources, he describes the evolution of unmanned reconnaissance vehicles from the early years, emphasizing the U.S. program while summarizing what is known from the open press about the Soviet efforts. Of particular interest are his comments on the capabilities and limitations of space vehicles for intelligence purposes, their value in policing arms limitation agreements and generally assisting in the maintenance of peace, as well as the possibility of anti-satellite development. The book covers material not available elsewhere in one volume at the time of publication.

KNORR, Klaus E. <u>Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences</u>. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964. (Research Monograph No. 17, Center of International Studies). Bibl. 58 p. No index.

This study presents a short and interesting analysis of the relationships between intelligence and the social sciences, especially in what Prof. Knorr calls "the predictive function of intelligence". His thesis is that such production can only benefit by continued application of the social sciences and its methodology.

KNORR, Klaus and Patrick Morgan, eds. <u>Strategic Military Surprise:</u> <u>Incentives and Opportunities</u>. New <u>Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1983, 1984</u>. (Pap. only). Bibl. notes (at end of each chapter). 265 p. No index.

This is an anthology on the subject by five authors. Prof. Knorr writes of strategic surprise in four European wars: Austria vs. Prussia in 1866; the Franco-Prussian War of 1870; World Wars I and II. Prof. Morgan considers strategic surprise in the Far East, commencing with the Russo-Japanese war in 1904, and including Japanese aggressions in World War II, the atomic bomb attack, and the Soviet attacks in the Far East at the end of World War II. Richard Betts writes on what he calls "strategic surprise for termination": Inchon, Dienbienphu, and Tet.

* KOCH, Brig. Gen.Oscar W. with Robert G. Hays. G-2: Intelligence for Patton. Philadelphia: Whitmore Publishing Company, 1971. 167 p. No index.

General Patton's successes on the battlefield could not have been accomplished without an effective and aggressive intelligence effort and the commander's appreciation and use of the intelligence product. Brigadier General Koch was on Patton's G-2 staff in North Africa, becoming the G-2 at the start of planning in Africa for the invasion of Sicily, and serving as Patton's G-2 throughout the campaign in Sicily and for the remainder of the war in Europe. He relates his experiences with this dynamic and controversial leader in a highly readable fashion. The insider's view of the intelligence support for Patton's operations, particularly its role in the Ardennes campaign, is of great interest and value to the student of military intelligence. Regrettably, this book was published prior to the public revelation that the British had broken the German World War II ciphers. Therefore, the role of communications intelligence on General Patton's decisions is not included.

KOZACZUK, Wladyslaw. Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher Was Broken, and How It Was Read by the Allies in World War Two. Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1984. (Edited and Translated by Christopher Kasparek). Notes, including bibl. notes (at end of chapters). Bibl. 348 p.

Kozaczuk is believed to have been a former Polish Army colonel, a PhD. who later worked in the Military Historical Institute in Warsaw. His earlier book. The Battle of Secrets: The Intelligence Services of Poland and the German Reich, 1922-1939, was published in Warsaw in 1967. British official historians characterize it as "the earliest [book] to reveal the fact that the Enigma had been broken". Kozaczuk's present book, Enigma, was published in Warsaw in 1979. Its major focus is on the role of Polish cryptologists in breaking the early German (pre-World War II) Enigma These early Polish successes were achieved largely by three brilliant young mathematicians, with one of whom, Marian Rejewski, Kozaczuk seems to have nad lengthy conversations in assembling this volume. An interview with Rejewski and some of the latter's own writings on Enigma are included in the appendices, increasing the importance of this book. The reader should be warned, however, that much of the latter material is highly technical and hardly bedside reading. Two criticisms of this book should be noted: Kozaczuk's presentation is perhaps overbalanced by his desire to give his Polish compatriots more credit than perhaps they should receive, major though their early role was. In addition, when writing of matters after the Polish contributions, Kozaczuk has at times leaned on some rather weak published sources (Winterbotham in particular). Nevertheless, this volume should be placed on the shelf of important books on the Ultra secret.

KRIVITSKY, Walter G. <u>In Stalin's Secret Service</u>: <u>An Exposé of Russia's Secret Policies by the Former Chief of the Seviet Intelligence in Western Europe</u>. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939. 273 p. No index.

Krivitsky joined Soviet military intelligence about 1920 and remained with that service until the early 1930's when he transferred to the NKVD. defected in 1937, coming to America soon after. krivitsky's body (with a pistol) was found in a locked Washington hotel room in 1941. All obvious evidence pointed to suicide, and the case was immediately closed by the police on that basis. Later information gives every indication that he may have been murdered by the Seviets, a fate which he had expected and had tried to evade. Krivitsky's book is considered an important "core" book in the intelligence literature written by Soviet defectors. However, it is of mixed quality and occasionally subject to challenge in the light of later factual data. These errors are largely the product of writers and editors who helped Krivitsky in preparing his text and include some inaccurate "build up" material which Krivitsky was apparently willing to accept. Thus he was never a general, a title conferred by the media; nor was he "the former chief of the Soviet intelligence in Western Europe" as he and the subtitle of the book proclaim. In fact, his last post was as a Soviet NKVD "illegal" - and a good one - tood in The Mague. Despite some

shortcomings, there is excellent material in this book, including descriptions of such matters as the Soviet purge trials and the Tukhachevsky affair, and other happenings of which Krivitsky had personal knowledge. Above all, the flavor of Stalin's heinous actions comes through, including the liquidation of many seasoned Soviet intelligence operatives in the 1930's, which makes this volume an important work.

U.S. CONGRESS. HOUSE. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES. Hearings. Testimony of walter G. Krivitsky. 11 October 1939. pp. 5719-5742.

KUUSINEN, Aino. The Rings of Destiny: Inside Soviet Russia from Lenin to Brezhnev. New York: Morrow, 1974. Foreword by Wolfgang Leonard. Notes. Bibl. 255 p.

An extremely interesting account of developments in the USSR by the widow of the late Comintern and Soviet Party luminary, Otto Kuusinen. This book is especially valuable for the insights given to the Shanghai phase, in the 1930's, of the intelligence activities of the famous Soviet agent Richard Sorge and his successors in China. The work provides information and clues not available in other accounts of Sorge's operations (q.v. Deakin & Storry, The Case of Richard Sorge).

LAMPE, David. The Savage Canary: The Story of Resistance in Denmark. London: Cassell & Co., 1957. Foreword by Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry. 236 p. (An American paperback edition, under title of The Danish Resistance, was published in New York: Ballantine Books, 1960).

This volume describes the high spots and personalities of the Danish Resistance in World War II, with much material on resistance tradecraft.

LANGLEY, James Maydon. <u>Fight Another Day</u>. London: Collins, 1974. Introduction by Airey Neave. 254 p. No index.

The author, who escaped from France, was an MI 6 officer assigned to MI 9, the British Intelligence organization established to handle the problems of escape and evasion from occupied Europe during World War II. Langley's task, among others, was to make certain that MI 9 activities did not impinge on those of MI 6. The book tells of the work of MI 9 and also relates Langley's experiences as the British commander (jointly with an American officer) of IS 9, established to go into Europe behind the advancing Allied armies to continue to rescue Allied prisoners and to reward those who had helped them to escape during the War. While it lacks sufficient detail for other than the casual reader, this volume is particularly interesting for its discussion of MI 9's relations with MI 6,

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the British Secret Intelligence Service. It gives little attention to the American role in IS 9. (q.v.Neave, $\underline{\text{The Escape Room}}$ and Foot and Langley, $\underline{\text{MI 9}}$).

LASBY, Clarence G. <u>Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War</u>. New York: Atheneum, 1971. Bibl. notes. Bibl. comment. 338 p. (pap. N.Y.: Atheneum, 1975).

An interesting look at the U.S. intelligence effort to find and exploit German scientists and technicians as World War II drew to an end and immediately thereafter.

Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (December 1917 to February 1922). Oxford: Oxford University (Clarendon) Press, 1981. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 514 p.

This volume is considered to be the definitive book, at present, on the first formative five years of the Soviet Security service. The name of the Cheka, 1917-1922, was changed in the latter year to GPU; the name subsequently was changed several more times before becoming the KGB.

LEVERKUEHN, Paul. German Military Intelligence. New York: Praeger, 1954. 209 p.

An account of German WWII intelligence activity written by a former member of the Abwehr, the German intelligence organization. The final chapter provides an insider's view of the famed Admiral Canaris, head of the Abwehr. (q.v. Brissaud, <u>Canaris</u>).

* LEWIN, Ronald. The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers And The Defeat Of Japan. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1982. Illus. Maps. Bibl. fns. Bibl. 332 p. (pap. N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1983).

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This book by the distinguished British military historian, the late Ronald Lewin, is the first comprehensive history of the break into high level Japanese codes and ciphers by the Americans in World War II. An historically accurate and well written account from the pre-war breaking of the Japanese diplomatic (Purple) cipher (known as "Magic"), through the breaking of Japanese military and naval ciphers (under the ultimate generic term of "Ultra"), this book relates the effect of these breakthroughs on the battles and campaigns of the war in the Pacific. Through the role of the coast-watchers and traffic analysis in the battle for the Solomons, through the cipher break which made possible the victories at the Coral Sea and Midway and the shoot down of Admiral Yamamoto, to VJ-Day, Lewin decribes the major aspects of the cryptologic war. He examines the role of Magic at Pearl Harbor, coming down hard against those who view

the attack as a Roosevelt "conspiracy" to drag America into the war. Lewin is no admirer of MacArthur's use of intelligence in general and his use of Ultra material in particular. This volume is highly important in the literature of cryptology in World War II.

* LEWIN, Ronald. <u>Ultra Goes to War</u>: <u>The First Account of World War II's</u>
<u>Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents</u>. New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Co., 1978. Notes. Bibl. 397 p. (pap. N.Y.: Pocket Books, 1980)

Lewin, a highly respected British military historian, has written several books on military and political leaders of World War II. In Ultra Goes to War, he first traces the development of the German Enigma enciphering machine, the pre-war work of the Polish Secret Service's cryptologic staff in breaking some early Enigma ciphers and using their technical knowledge to construct some Enigma replicas, and their pre-war liaison with the French and British. The book then details some of the arduous and brillant work of the British code breakers at Bletchley Park, culminating in the first breakthrough into some of the Enigma messages in the spring of 1940. Lewin has had access to a considerable quantity of recently declassified Ultra messages as well as to many Allied users as sources for his book. He makes a major contribution to World War II historiography in his study of the impact of the Ultra material on the major battles and campaigns of the war in the West. The author does not hesitate to point out that Ultra material (from various systems of German cipher machines) could not turn some indifferent Allied officers or initially weaker Allied troop strengths into instant victors. Nor does the author slight the contributions of those American officers who were assigned to Bletchley Park to aid the workers there, and those American intelligence officers who handled the Ultra material in the field. One other important point which Lewin makes is that, with hundreds of people, British and American, who were privy to Ultra, the vital secret of its existence remained without a breach throughout the War and for many years thereafter.

LONSDALE, Gordon, (pseud. for Konon Molodiy). Spy: Twenty Years of Secret Service: Memoirs of Gordon Lonsdale. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1965.

220 p. No index.

Konon Molodiy, a Soviet illegal who used the pseudonym Gordon Lonsdale, presents his account of his career in Soviet intelligence, from anti-Nazi underground work to his 1964 release from a British prison in exchange for Greville Wynne (q.v.). Lonsdale had been convicted in 1961 for espionage in the "Portland Naval Secrets" case. This book is unreliable, for the author's text is written purely for Soviet propaganda and disinformation purposes, but it is of interest to the trained intelligence officer. It is believed that this book was at the least edited by "Kim" Philby (q.v.).

LORD, Walter. Lonely Vigil: Coastwatchers of the Solomons. New York: Viking Press, 1977. 332 p. (pap. N.Y.: Pocket Books, 1978).

A professional writer, Lord served in the OSS in World War II. This book, a popularly written history, tells the story of the Coastwatchers in the Solomon Islands. These watchers, mostly Australians who had worked in the islands before the war, as well as trusted native helpers, lived behind the Japanese lines in these South Pacific islands and reported on Japanese ship and aircraft movements. They performed an integral part in the battle for Guadalcanal and the other Solomon Islands. Their story, a unique intelligence operation, is graphically told here, in considerable measure from the author's interviews with surviving Coastwatchers. Of particular interest is the chapter on their rescue of John F. Kennedy and his crew after the sinking of his PT 109. (For additional reading, see Eric Feldt, The Coast Watchers, Melbourne: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1946; Oxford also published an abridged U.S. Edition in the same year. Feldt was the original organizer and leader of the Coastwatchers, until he was crippled and retired by a stroke).

LOTZ, Wolfgang. The Champagne Spy: Israel's Master Spy Tells His Story. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972, 240 p. (pap. New York: Manor Books, 1973).

An interesting, readable account of an Israeli "illegal" who lived in Egypt, mixed with the top level of Egyptian society, and provided valuable intelligence to the Israeli Services until he was caught in 1965.

McCHRISTIAN, Major General Joseph A. The Role of Military Intelligence 1965-1967. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974. 182 p. (pap).

This brief monograph is one of the Department of the Army series of "Vietnam Studies." MG McChristian here sets forth his experiences as J-2, MACV, 1965-67. In 1968, he became Chief of Army Intelligence, retiring in 1971. The principal areas he describes are organization, U.S.-South Vietnamese combined military intelligence activities, intelligence operations and production, counterintelligence, and intelligence support activities. The author is writing within the limitations of an unclassified monograph, so that much that he might wish to say, and great detail, have been omitted.

McGARVEY, Patrick J. <u>CIA</u>: <u>The Myth and the Madness</u>. New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972. 240 p. No index. (pap. N.Y.: Penguin, 1973).

An indictment of CIA, DIA, and the US Intelligence Community by a former CIA and DIA employee with 14 years of low to middle level intelligence experience. Although McGarvey notes and illustrates several of the major

problems in US intelligence activities, his biased and unbalanced criticisms, frequent errors of fact, and lack of realistic solutions detract from the book's value.

* McLACHLAN, Donald. Room 39: a study in Naval Intelligence. New York:
Atheneum, 1968. Foreword by Admiral of the Fleet, The Earl Mountbatten of
Burma. Notes. 438 p.

A history of British Naval Intelligence in WWII. The late author, a journalist who was on the personal staff of the Director of British Naval Intelligence, 1940-45, discusses the structure, operations, successes, and failures of that service. Chapter 15, on lessons learned, is of particular value. For security reasons at the time of writing, this book does not discuss the role of communications intelligence. Nevertheless, it is considered by many to be a very fine contribution to the literature.

MARCHETTI, Victor L. and John D. Marks. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974. Publisher's note. Introduction by Melvin L. Wulf, American Civil Liberties Union. 398 p. (New revised pap. N.Y.: Dell Publishing Co., 1980).

Marchetti's fourteen year service in CIA included the position of executive assistant to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Marks spent four years in State Department intelligence, including service as staff assistant to the Director of Intelligence and Research. As a result of its security review of the manuscript, CIA deleted more than 160 items involving unauthorized disclosure of classified information. position was sustained in the subsequent litigation. CIA considered an additional large number of items for deletion, but determined that they could be published; these now appear in bold face type in the text. book is marked by its heavy attacks on CIA's Clandestine Service in general, and covert action operations in particular. It also contains lengthy pleas for tight legislative control of CIA, and attacks the necessity for secrecy in much that CIA does. It is an uneven book whose polemics tend to unbalance what valid material it may contain. Failure to delete any criticism of the Agency, or other material which the published book contains, is not meant to imply any endorsement by CIA of contents or this volume's accuracy.

* MASTERMAN, Sir John C. <u>The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945</u>. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1972. Foreword by Norman Holmes Pearson. 203 p. (pap. N.Y.: Avon Books, 1972; N.Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1982).

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The late Sir John Masterman was Chairman of the British Double-Cross (XX) Committee during World War II. At the end of the war, he wrote this text as an official classified history. Release, slightly sanitized, was authorized for publication by the British authorities in 1971. The book

describes the highly complex and successful efforts of British Intelligence to neutralize, and in many cases to utilize, the services of every German agent in Britain during the War. A major text on counterintelligence and deception, the book is a veritable classic treatise on this type of work and the meticulous coordination which it requires. A major lack is that the volume contains no direct reference to the Ultra material which was so essential for checking on the success of these operations. The Ultra secret was not made public officially in England until 1974. (q.v. Montagu, Beyond Top Secret Ultra).

MATHAMS, Robert H. Sub Rosa: Memoirs of an Australian Intelligence Analyst. Sydney, Australia, and London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982. (Also obtainable from Allen & Unwin, Winchester, Mass. 01890). 127 p.

Mathams was a career intelligence analyst. In 1955, he became the first scientific intelligence analyst in the Australian Joint Intelligence Bureau, ultimately heading its Scientific Intelligence Group. With the reorganization of Australian intelligence, he became Director, Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Joint Intelligence Organization, holding the latter post for almost a decade before his retirement in 1979. In this book, the author continually stresses the need for the career analyst, constantly trained, and producing objective, intellectually honest assessments. Mathams also presents his views on Australian substantive liaison with U.S. intelligence officials, as well as his thoughts on Australian intelligence organization. This important book is unique in the recent literature in dealing with scientific and technical intelligence as an essential aspect of strategic or national intelligence.

MELVERN, Linda, Nick Anning, and David Hebditch. <u>Techno-Bandits</u>. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1984. Bibl. notes. 313 p.

Despite its somewhat lurid title and jacket blurb, this is a competent, readable treatment of the story of the greatly increased Communist bloc (although principally the Soviet Union) emphasis on acquisition of Western (mainly US) high technology by legal and illegal means since the early 1970's. It is the first really good statement, in book form, that has become available to the general public on the problem of illegal technology transfer in support of the military and industrial development of the Communist nations. This volume correctly emphasizes the leading role of the Soviet intelligence services, the KGB and GRU, in support of a centrally-directed program of acquisition of advanced technology information and hardware to meet the needs of Soviet defense industry in a rapidly changing strategic environment. The book is based on extensive interviews with representatives of government and industry in Western countries, plus an in-depth examination of public records and press accounts of court cases of COCOM violations. The author team includes an investigative reporter, an electronics expert and a Soviet affairs

specialist. They have done their homework well in producing a useful, well written and referenced introduction to a subject of high current interest to the Intelligence Community.

MEYER, Cord. Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA. New York: Harper & Row, 1980. Bibl. notes. 433 p.

This autobiography commences with the author's undergraduate days at Yale and his World War II career as a Marine officer in the South Pacific, where he was badly wounded, and describes his search for world peace in the establishment of the United World Federalists. In 1951, Meyer joined the CIA, where he served for more than 25 years. He describes his principal assignment as head of CIA's International Organizations Division which was charged, through covert action and other means, to counter the Soviet political and propaganda offensive against the Free World; he subsequently served as Deputy Chief of CIA's Clandestine Service. Meyer's chapters on the Cold War and on the U.S. controlled Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are particularly illuminating, as are his chapters on the Soviet Union and its KGB. This is an important and carefully written book.

MONAS, Sidney. The Third Section: Police and Society in Russia Under Nicholas I. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1961. Bibl. 354 p.

An excellent study of that period in Russian history which witnessed the permanent institutionalization of the secret police. Dr. Monas not only discusses the creation and operations of the famous Third Section, but also analyzes the impact this organization had on 19th century Russian society. His concluding remark is that while there is no historical parallel between the Third Section and the KGB, there is "indeed a tragic and historical connection."

MONAT, Pawel with John Dille. Spy in the U.S. New York: Harper and Row, 1961. 208 p. No index.

Reminiscences and reflections of the former Polish military attaché in Washington on his intelligence gathering activities in the U.S. and the control of the Polish Service by the Soviets. Intelligence tradecraft, as practiced in these operations, is well described.

U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. Hearing. Soviet Espionage Through Poland. Testimony of Pawel Monat. 13 June 1960. pp. 1-41.

MONTAGU, Ewen E.S. <u>Beyond Top Secret Ultra</u>. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1978. Foreword by Hugh Trevor-Roper. 192 p.

This book is the World War II memoir of a British Naval Intelligence Officer, Ewen Montagu. In particular, he was the Naval Intelligence member of the Double-Cross (XX) Committee headed by John Masterman (q.v.). This Committee set the policy for running the doubled German agents in England against the German Abwehr for intelligence and deception purposes up to and through the Normandy invasion. Montagu handled all of the ULTRA and Abwehr traffic pertaining to naval XX matters in furtherance of the XX Committee's activities. Montagu also briefly describes Operation Mincemeat, a major British deception operation in connection with the Allied invasion of Sicily. He was the case officer for this operation, which is described in greater detail in his earlier book, The Man Who Never Was (q.v.). These memoirs are highly authoritative, as well as a charming and well written contribution to the literature of intelligence.

MONTAGU, Ewen E. S. The Man Who Never Was. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1954, rev. ed. 1967. Foreword by General The Rt. Hon. Lord Ismay. 160 p. No index. (pap. N.Y.: Bantam Books, 1964). (Subsequent editions of the book contain additional material about German reaction to this operation).

The story of the classic British deception Operation Mincemeat prior to the 1943 Allied invasion of Sicily in WWII. Ilustrates exemplary intelligence planning with respect to documentation, both personal and official, and estimate of German reactions. An excellent example of applied cover and deception as part of the British Double Cross operations. (q.v. Masterman).

MORAVEC, General Frantisek. Master of Spies: The Memoirs of General Frantisek Moravec. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1975. Foreword by Hanyi Moravec Disher. 240 p. No index.

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General Moravec was the head of Czechoslovak Military Intelligence from 1937-1945. The book describes his efforts to develop this excellent service in the light of the General's certainty of oncoming hostilities with Germany. On the day in March 1939 that the Germans arrived in Prague, British Intelligence evacuated Moravec and eleven of his best officers to London, where they served for the duration. Following the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948, the General and his family again fled to the West, and the book includes nothing of his subsequent work. Although discreet, it is one of the finest memoirs of its kind by a first-class intelligence officer. Among the interesting materials included are Moravec's account of the important information obtained from his best German agent, A-54, and the author's role in selecting and training the Czech agents for the assassination of Heydrich. preface to the British edition of this volume, Sir John Masterman (q.v.) gives as his opinion that "this is the best book on espionage and counterespionage which I have read since the war ended".

MOYZISCH, L. C. Operation Cicero. New York: Coward-McCann, 1950. Postcript by Franz von Papen. 209 p. No index. (pap. N.Y.: Bantam Books, 1952: Pyramid Books, 1958).

An interesting description of the Cicero espionage operation in Turkey during World War II. Written by Cicero's German case officer (q.v. Bazna, I Was Cicero). Because this book was written so soon after the events, it cannot take in later accounts and evaluations, including the possibility that the British learned of the operation in time to use it for deception purposes of their own.

MYAGKOV, Aleksei. <u>Inside the KSB</u>: <u>An expose by an officer of the Third Directorate</u>. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1977. 131 p. No index. (pap. N.Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1981).

Captain Myagkov is a significant K33 defector, first coming to the British in West Berlin early in 1974. He is the only defector to come out of the KGB. Third Directorate which is responsible for security and counterintelligence in the Soviet Armed Forces. This book is inimitably Myagkov's own account and draws extensively on the unique KGB training lecture notes and directives he brought out with him. Some of the latter are reproduced in their entirecy. Many of the others are worked into the text. This book is an important eye witness account of a Directorate on which little has been written, and it is based on solid documentation.

NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER. CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's. Washington: National Strategy Information Center, 1979-1393. No index.

(Vol. 1). Elements of intelligence (1979); 91 p. + 31 p. Revised edition (1983), 143 p.

(Vol. 2). Analysis and Estimates (1980); 223 p.

(Vol. 3). Counterintelligence (1980): 339 p.

(Vol. 4). Covert Action (1981); 243 p.

(VOL. 5). Clandestine Collection (1982); 232 p.

The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence was established to conduct a series of seminars to produce papers and discussions on all aspects of the intelligence process. The ultimate purpose is to encourage teaching and research in this field as well as the development of intelligence theory. The participants in these seminars include experienced retired intelligence professionals, scholars and teachers in political science, history, and law, as well as journalists and member of the staffs of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence. While many of the papers published in these valumes, (edited by Dr. Roy Godson of Georgetown University), are of uneven quality, as are the accompanying discussions of the papers, others deserve to be read with great care and interest by professionals and non-professionals alike.

NEAVE, Airey. The Escape Room. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1970. 319 p. No index. (pap. N.Y.: Tower Publications, 1972).

This is a slightly abridged edition of the late author's original British book (Saturday at M.I.9. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969). After his escape from the supposedly escape-proof German prison of Colditz Castle (which he described in detail in his book, They Have Their Exits, Boston: Little, Brown, 1953), Neave became a key figure in MI 9, the British intelligence organization concerned with evasion and escape. His book tells of some of the major personnel who established the escape lines in occupied Europe, how the lines were organized, their successes and failures. (q.v. Foot and Langley, MI 9. For further reading, see Donald Darling, Secret Sunday. London: Kimber, 1975).

NICOLAI, Colonel Walther. The German Secret Service. London: Stanley Paul, 1924. 298 p. No index.

Colonel Nicolai, chief of the German Secret Service in World War I, discusses his work in the field of espionage and counterintelligence. Included is a chapter (by the translator) on the case of Colonel Redl, onetime counterintelligence chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, who was recruited as a penetration agent by the Russians through their knowledge of Redl's homosexual activities. The passage of time has somewhat reduced the importance of Nicolai's book, but, prior to World War II, it was "required" reading by intelligence officers. Today, while still of interest, the reader should realize that the author has written largely in generalities, with errors both in facts and judgments. (q.v. Strong, Men of Intelligence. pp. 5-11).

* ORLOV, Alexander. Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1963. 187 p. No index.

An authoritative work by a former Lieutenant General of the NKVD on the techniques (many still applicable) of clandestine intelligence and clandestine warfare as practiced by the Soviets in the 1920's and 1930's. This book is an updated recreation of an intelligence manual which Orlov had written in 1936. It is particularly important on the operational techniques of Soviet "illegals". The author defected in 1938 while serving as the NKVD rezident in Spain during the Spanish Civil War.

U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. <u>Hearing</u>. (in Executive Session: released in 1962). <u>Testimony of Alexander Orlov</u>. 28 September 1955. pp. 1-20.

U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. <u>Hearings</u>. <u>Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States</u>, Part 51. <u>Testimony of Alexander Orlov</u>. 14-15 February 1957. pp. 3421-3439, 3441-3471.

Much of this testimony also appears in the Internal Security Subcommittee Report entitled The Legacy of Alexander Orlov, published in August 1973.

OVERSTREET, Harry and Bonaro. The FBI in Our Open Society. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969. 400 p.

One of the few books available that attempts an overall evaluation of the FBI, from its early days up to the activities of the late 1960's. The section on the "Controversial Bureau" focuses on early criticisms of the Bureau and provides an interesting commentary. On balance, the book favorably portrays the FBI; it should be noted, however, that the more intense criticism of the Bureau and its leadership surfaced after publication of this book. (q.v. Ungar).

PAGE, Bruce with David Leitch and Phillip Knightley. The Philby Conspiracy. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1968. 300 p. (pap. N. Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1981).

A team of British journalists describes the Philby case, including his lengthy service as a Soviet agent, his rise to senior ranks within the British Secret Intelligence Service, his relationship with the defectors Burgess and Maclean, and Philby's tour in the U.S. in an intelligence liaison capacity. One knowledgeable historian of these events characterizes this book as "instant history" or "high-class journalism" lacking dimension, having "no corrective background, no reflective depth". (q.v. Boyle, Philby, Seale and McConville, Trevor-Roper).

PASH, Boris, T. The ALSOS Mission. New York: Award House, 1969. 256 p. No index.

An excellent treatment of the ALSOS mission in WWII by the military leader of the combined military-scientific team. (q.v. Goudsmit, ALSOS). Describes the problems, operations, and results of this critical intelligence mission to determine the extent of German progress on atomic research/production and capturing German scientists involved.

PATTI, Archimedes L. A. Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America's Albatross.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Appendices. Bibl. notes.
Bibl. 612 p. (pap. Same imprint, 1981).

After OSS experience in the Mediterranean Theater, Patti became the head of the OSS Indochina desk in Washington in mid-1944. In April 1945, Patti arrived in Kunming, China, to head the OSS desk there for operations in

Indochina, and particularly to direct the collection of intelligence against the Japanese in Indochina. In late August 1945, Patti became the first OSS chief of station in Hanoi until 1 October 1945, when he left (in part at French insistence). While aware of Ho Chi Minh's communist part at French insistence). While aware of Ho Chi Minh's communist background, OSS accepted and disseminated the information he provided about Japanese activities and events in Indochina. In turn, Ho hoped for American backing for Vietnamese post-war independence from Frenchcolonialist domination. Patti had access to the OSS files in writing this heavily footnoted book, which covers the history of OSS intelligence activities involving Indochina and the U.S. political decisions on that country until the ouster of the French in the mid-50's. The result is a highly controversial work, largely because of Patti's friendship with, and admiration for, Ho Chi Minh, whom he tended to consider more nationalist than communist at the time. Patti's own strong views against the French in Indochina are freely expressed, together with his speculation as to the course of history if the U.S. had backed Ho's struggle for an independent Indochina.

PEERS, <u>Lieutenant General</u> William R. <u>and</u> Dean Brelis. <u>Behind the Burma</u> Road: The Story of America's <u>Most Successful Guerrilla Force</u>. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. 264 p.

History of the operations of OSS Detachment 101 operating behind the Japanese lines in Burma. Peers was the commanding officer of the Detachment; Brelis served under him. Although the most spectacular of these operations were paramilitary, they were intertwined with collection of important tactical intelligence in support of the regular military forces. (For additional information on OSS Detachment 101, see Richard Dunlop, Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma. New York: Rand McNally, 1979. 448 p.)

* PENKOVSKIY, Oleg. <u>The Penkovskiy Papers</u>. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1965. Translated by Peter Deriabin. Foreword by Edward Crankshaw. A Personal Comment by Greville Wynne. 411 p. No index. (pap. N. Y.: Avon Books 1966; N. Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1982).

The story of a Soviet GRU officer who provided information of tremendous importance to British and American intelligence in 1961-62 while continuing his service in the Soviet Union. As an agent-in-place for sixteen months, Colonel Penkovskiy's case constitutes one of the most significant Western intelligence coups in recent times and offers great benefit for those career intelligence officers who study it. Following his arrest by the Soviets in October 1962, Penkovskiy was publicly tried in 1963 and sentenced to be executed. Of particular interest, because of the controversy over the book's publication, is Gibney's new introduction in the Ballantine 1982 paperback edition.

PERSICO, Joseph E. <u>Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II</u>. New York: Viking Press, 1979. Bibl. 376 p. (pap. N. Y.: Ballantine Books, 1979).

Persico, for more than a decade, was chief speechwriter for Governor (and later Vice President) Nelson Rockefeller. When the latter retired from political office, Persico determined to write this book on the penetration of Nazi Germany (and Austria) by agents of the OSS. Through Freedom of Information Act requests, he was able to obtain several hundred previously classified documents from CIA's OSS archives; he was also able to reach over 100 of the participants in the operations—agents, staff and case officers, and support personnel. A few of these operations had strategic merit. Most of them were tactical in nature, supplying important order of battle and targeting information from behind the German lines facing the Allies' advancing armies in Europe. Piercing the Reich is the first real effort at considering these operations on German soil in their entirety. As such it deserves good marks. It is of interest to note that the officer directing these operations was William J. Casey, who became Director of Central Intelligence in the Reagan Administration.

PETROV, Viadimir and Evdokia. Empire of Fear. New York: Praeger, 1956. 351 p.

The personal account by a husband and wife who were long-time Soviet intelligence employees prior to their dramatic defection from their posts in Australia in the early 1950's. Petrov was a veteran senior MVD official and chief of the MVD station in Australia; his wife was a code clerk. Recommended for an insight into the Soviet state, its intelligence apparatus and operations. (q.v. Australia, Commonwealth of. Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage, which should be read in conjunction with these memoirs for more detailed revelations on their Soviet intelligence activities there).

PETTEE, George S. <u>The Future of American Secret Intelligence</u>. Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946. 120 p.

Although now dated, this book has historical value in its trailbreaking discussion of specific intelligence substantive and organizational problems, as seen by the author, which occurred during WWII and prior to formation of the CIA.

PFALTZGRAFF, Robert L., Jr., Uri Ra'anan, <u>and</u> Warren Milberg, <u>eds.</u> <u>Intelligence Policy and National Security</u>. <u>London: The Macmillan Press, 1981. 318 p.</u>

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The papers in this volume grew out of a 1979 Conference hosted by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The overall Conference title was "Intelligence: Deception and Surprise", but the intelligence subjects

covered were somewhat broader in scope. The participants came from government, academe, and the private sector. Their contributions were later expanded, updated, and some papers were added, to form this compendium. Among the authors are the distinguished R. V. Jones, Roberta Wohlstetter, Ithiel de Sola Pool, John Erickson, Richard Pipes, William Colby, Amron Katz, Richard Betts, John Roche, and Thomas Latimer. A volume such as this is often simplistic and uneven in quality, but it presents a series of viewpoints - a wrap up of thoughts at a particular point of time. The reputations of many of the authors as "thinkers" in the field of intelligence makes this book an interesting contribution to the literature and worth reading into.

PHILBY, Harold Adrian Russell ("Kim"). My Silent War. New York: Grove Press, 1968. 262 p. No index. (pap. N. Y.: Dell Publishing Co., 1968; N. Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1983).

This is Philby's own account of his career as a Soviet double agent in the British Secret Intelligence Service. This book was written in Moscow after Philby's defection to the Soviet Union. It is basically a work which has been described as "careful and skilful propaganda ... highly selective", designed to further Moscow's aims in a classic example of Soviet disinformation. Where he decides to be factual, Philby is perceptive, while at the same time attempting to create distrust between London and Washington and within MI-6 itself. The book must be read with care because of this and studied carefully by the experienced intelligence officer. (q.v. Boyle, Page, et al., Seale and McConville, Trevor-Roper).

PHILLIPS, David Atlee. <u>Careers in Secret Operations: How to Be a Federal Intelligence Officer</u>. Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of Bibl. chapter, "What to Read". 93 p. (Pap. Box 17320, Bethesda, Md.: Stone Trail Press, 1984).

Phillips, (q.v. The Night Watch), a veteran CIA professional who, since his retirement in 1975 has spoken in support of American intelligence before students on countless campuses across the United States, has written a unique and valuable handbook for those interested in making any of the various aspects of intelligence their profession. The book briefly describes the work people actually perform in intelligence, both overt and covert, and tells how and where to apply for employment at the several key U.S. agencies involved, as well as the skills and backgrounds these agencies desire. The book also has a very short but useful reading list on intelligence.

PHILLIPS, David Atlee. The Night Watch. New York: Atheneum, 1977. 309 p. (pap. N. Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1982).

The author's relations with CIA began on a contractual basis in South America in 1950. After some years in this status, Phillips became a full-

time member of CIA's Clandestine Service, served in three countries in Latin America as Chief of Station, and rose to be the head of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division. In 1975, he retired in order to speak out publicly in defense of the need for a strong American Intelligence Community (while recognizing some of its shortcomings) and to found the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) for the same purpose. His book is a well-written, anecdotal and philosophic story of his intelligence career. It gives a meaningful account of the work and thoughts of a successful career officer, with obvious emphasis on his area of speciality.

PILAT, Oliver. The Atom Spies. New York: Putnam, 1952. 312 p.

An excellent account of the Soviet atomic espionage rings operating in the U.S. during the 1940's and 1950's.

PLATT, <u>Brigadier General</u> Washington. <u>National Character in Action:</u> <u>Intelligence Factors in Foreign Relations.</u> New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1961. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 250 p.

General Platt states his thesis for the book as follows: "In every problem of international relations, the character of the people concerned must always be considered." In this book Platt discusses both general concepts and specific cases of national character in action. His findings are intended to guide both the intelligence officer and the decision maker. As one of the few writers to discuss this problem in such depth, the book is worthy of consideration by the intelligence officer/analyst.

PLATT, <u>Brigadier General</u> Wahington. <u>Strategic Intelligence Production: Basic Principles</u>. New York: Praeger, 1957. Bibl. 302 p.

An experienced Army and CIA intelligence officer discusses the basic principles of strategic intelligence production. Platt describes working level performance from the perspective of the analyst. The author enumerates nine principles which may be useful guides for the intelligence officer/analyst. Difficult reading at times, but of value because of the few books on the subject.

POPOV, Dusko. Spy/Counterspy: The Autobiography of Dusko Popov. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1974. Foreword by Ewen E. S. Montagu. 339 p. No index. (pap. Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett Publications, 1975).

Popov, while ostensibly working for the German Abwehr during World War II, was actually one of the best agents for the British in the Double-Cross system (q.v. Masterman). He is agent "Tricycle" in the Masterman book, and his autobiography makes pleasant and informative reading about the life of an unusual double agent in that dangerous work. His relations

with the FBI while in America should be read with some caution because of more recent information now released from the FBI files.

POWE, Marc B. and Edward E. Wilson. The Evolution of American Military Intelligence. Supr 02520. Fort Huachuca, Arizona: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, 1973. 148 p.

This well-researched text, prepared by two officers of the staff and faculty of the U.S. Army Intelligence School, covers U.S. military intelligence activities from the American Revolution up to Vietnam. The emphasis, however, is definitely given to the creation of a professional military intelligence corps in the U.S. Army (as opposed to the earlier use of Pinkerton detectives and amateurs) from World War I to the present. A valuable text for unit unstruction.

POWERS, Francis Gary with Curt Gentry. Operation Overflight: The U-2 Spy Pilot Tells His Story for the First Time. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970. 375 p. No index. (pap. New York: Tower, 1970).

First-hand narrative of U-2 operations over the Soviet Union set against the background of the late Gary Powers' career as a U-2 pilot with CIA. Of special interest is Soviet handling of Powers during his trial and imprisonment following his shoot-down over Russia in May 1960.

POWERS, Thomas. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms & the CIA. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 393 p. (pap. New York: Pocket Books, 1981).

This book by a well known journalist is, on the one hand, the most comprehensive book on the CIA to date, and, on the other, seriously flawed with errors of fact and concept, some major, some minor. book's most important shortcomings is Powers' failure to recognize the world as it was after 1947, the fact that there was a serious Soviet threat, and his failure to weave the world situation into his CIA tapestry. The author's study of the mass of material he faced (including many interviews with former CIA officials) led him to change his mind on several of his original hostilities to his subject. Unfortunately, he still tries to make himself the moral judge of U.S. policies that CIA supported, although he denies that CIA was the "rogue elephant" that others have charged. The subtitle of this book is misleading; it is not the story of Richard Helms; the latter is more of a thread which winds through the book because of his lengthy career in intelligence. author does not understand Helms and is sometimes very unfair to him. This is a book, warts and all, which should be approached by the reader with a full recognition of its many errors, although it should be read by the professional.

PRADOS, John. The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis & Russian Military Strength. New York: Dial Press, 1982. Notes (incl. bibl. notes). Bibl. 367 p.

This book focuses on the U.S. intelligence estimative process and techniques used in determining Soviet military capabilities. with the limited estimative techniques first developed in OSS in World War II against the Axis, and coming forward to the more mature techniques and technology for monitoring and verification used in the U.S. estimates of the current Soviet scene, the author writes of dedicated analysts, demanding policymakers, and the human, institutional, and political factors which Prados feels invigorate and sometimes distort the estimative process. The author - as a complete outsider with no access to classified intelligence texts or processes - contributes the first in-depth book by an American on the most challenging and critical intelligence issue, U.S. estimates, (a few now declassified in whole or in part), of the Soviet capability to wage nuclear war. He relies to some extent on information from Congressional hearings as one of his sources. Prados contributes his thinking on the shortcomings of the process which have resulted, in his underestimates, in overestimates and and occasional misinterpretations of some of the data. While one can question some of Prados' assertions and general treatment of his material, he provides his audience, both in and outside the intelligence profession, with a timely, relevant, and informative book. Unfortunately, it must also be read with some caution because of some errors of fact.

RANSOM, Harry Howe. <u>Central Intellignece and National Security</u>. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1958. Bibl. Bibl. notes. 287 p.

One of the best early accounts of the development, organization and roblems of the U.S. intelligence system. Updated by Ransom's The https://ntelligence-Establishment (q.v.).

RANSOM, Harry Howe. <u>The Intelligence Establishment</u>. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 309 p.

A revision and expansion of the author's <u>Central Intelligence and National Security</u> (q.v.), but less accurate and credible. Discusses the nature of intelligence and the problems of intelligence in a democratic society. Includes a shallow look at the CIA and other members of the Intelligence Community, but with certain errors in his treatment of clandestine and modern technological intelligence activities for which his "library intelligence" research methods are understandably deficient.

ROOSEVELT, Kermit. <u>Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran.</u> New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1979. 217 p. (pap. Same imprint, 1981).

Roosevelt, a veteran OSS and CIA officer, was the principal case officer for Operation AJAX, the jointly planned Anglo-American operation for the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh of Iran in 1953 and the restoration of the Shah to his throne. Because Mossadegh had ordered virtually all Britishers out of Iran, the principal burden of this successful operation fell on the Americans. In the crucial days before AJAX, Roosevelt entered Iran clandestinely to take charge of the operation and maintain personal liaison with the Shah and a few other senior Iranians. This book is his description of Operation AJAX, its planning and approval at the highest levels of the British and American governments, and its execution. Originally scheduled for publication in the fall of 1979, it was withdrawn so that a few changes could be made, and was finally published in 1980.

ROSITZKE, Harry. The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977. Introduction by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 286 p.

Rositzke was a professional intelligence officer, first in OSS, then in CIA from which he retired in 1970. Virtually his entire career was spent in the Clandestine Service, where he held several senior positions. This book is intended neither as an expose nor as a manual of tradecraft, although it discusses a good many secret operations (heavily disguised as to places and dates). Rather it is an account of some of CIA's operations, expressing the author's praise, and, at times, his personal criticism. Rositzke has no doubt of the need for a professional service free of abuses, although one can differ with some of his remedies as expressed in the last chapter.

ROWAN, Richard W. with Robert G. Deindorfer. Secret Service: 33 Centuries of Espionage. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967. Foreword by Allen W. Dulles. Bibl. notes. 786 p.

Mr. Rowan's comprehensive (although understandably sometimes sketchy) history of espionage, published first in 1937 under the title of The Story of Secret Service, has been updated by Mr. Deindorfer. This is probably the most complete and comprehensive study in English of what Allen Dulles calls (in his foreword) "the historical sweep" of espionage down to 1937. As such, it still has utility. Mr. Deindorfer's new updating text, commencing at page 578, adds little of value, lacks balance or depth, and can be skipped.

SAKHAROV, Vladimir (Nikolayevich) and Umberto Tosi. <u>High Treason</u>. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1980. 318 p. No index. (pap. N. Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1981).

This is a provocative autobiography of one of the Soviet "Golden Youth," a son of the party-privileged "New Class," well-connected by multiple family ties with the security service. As a defector in 1971 to U.S. intelligence from his post in Kuwait, at age 26, he is one of the youngest knowledgeable defectors on record. Sakharov, whose story was first told by John Barron in a chapter of his book, KGB, (q.v.), emerges from his own more detailed account of his Ministry of Foreign Affairs career as an Arabic language expert and KGB co-optee, as a CIA agent-in-place, and as a new American thoroughly turned-off by his resettlement handling in the U.S. The book is important for its insights into a significant element of the Soviet ruling class and as a continuing reminder of the many-faceted problems of defectors and defection.

SCHELLENBERG, Walter. <u>The Labyrinth: Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg</u>. New York: Harper and Bros., 1956. Introduction by Alan Bullock. 423 p. (Abridged pap. N. Y.: Pyramid Books, 1958).

A revealing account of certain aspects of German intelligence by an important Nazi intelligence official. Schellenberg headed the foreign intelligence department of the Sicherheitsdienst of the Nazi party's Security Administration; he assumed control of all German military espionage (Abwehr) as well in 1944. In the light of later facts, this book should be read with some caution.

* Scholar's Guide to Intelligence Literature: Bibliography of the Russell J.

Bowen Collection in the Joseph Mark Lauinger Memorial Library, Georgetown
University. Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc.,
1983. (Published for the National Intelligence Study Center). 236 p.

Comprising some five thousand titles from Colonel Bowen's collection of intelligence related literature, (now on deposit at the Georgetown University Library and still growing), this bibliography is the most comprehensive work of its kind publicly available. Col Bowen, a thoroughgoing intelligence professional of long standing, has assembled a broad based collection of material on intelligence, security, and covert activities. The editors have divided the book into two main parts, with many subdivisions as to areas or countries, and time frames. These subdivisions are important, as it is patently impossible to do more with so vast a collection, and detailed annotations would be out of the question. (For an annotated bibliography of some 500 titles, q.v. Constantinides. Intelligence and Espionage). The first part of this work is devoted to "Intelligence Organizations and Activities", i.e., collection, counterintelligence and security, research and analysis, national intelligence establishments, etc. The second part comprises "Intelligence Related Topics", i.e., escape and evasion, psychological

warfare, unconventional warfare, etc. This <u>Scholar's Guide</u> is an excellent professional tool with which all intelligence personnel, as well as interested members of academe and the general public, should be acquainted.

SCHWIEN, <u>Colonel</u> Edwin E. <u>Combat Intelligence: Its Acquisition and Transmission</u>. Washington, D.C.: <u>Infantry Journal</u>, 1936. 121 p. No index.

Written in 1936 by an instructor in the Army's Command and General Staff School, the book is of interest on two counts: first, it reflects combat intelligence concepts as taught in the early 30's, and thus is of historical interest; and, second, its discussion of subjects such as "intentions" vs. "capabilities" and of the combat intelligence cycle in operation demonstrates that the basic principles, practices, and concepts of combat intelligence - despite the use of great technological advances - have changed little in 50 years.

SEALE, Patrick, and Maureen McConville. Philby: The Long Road to Moscow. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973. Bibl. notes. 282 p.

Athough a journalistic account, this was probably the best of the published books on the Philby affair at the time of publication. It has been overtaken by later information which throws doubts on some of the authors' judgments and factual data. (q.v. Philby, Page, et al., Boyle, Trevor-Roper).

SETH, Ronald. Encyclopedia of Espionage. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974. 718 p.

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In alphabetical order, Mr. Seth provides often lengthy articles on spies and intelligence organizations from the siege of Troy to the present, covering most countries of the world, as well as agents famous, infamous, and minor. The author, who served in the British SOE in World War II, has written several books on espionage. This one will serve as a handy reference - not a definitive guide - for the intelligence library.

SETH, Ronald. <u>Secret Servants: A History of Japanese Espionage</u>. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957. Bibl. 278 p.

One of the very few books in English on Japanese intelligence activities. Not considered particularly valuable or accurate in providing an insight into Japanese intelligence operations. Generally the book is unsourced, reducing its value as verifiable history.

SHACKLEY, Theodore. The Third Option: An American View of Counterinsurgency Operations. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1981. Bibl. 185 p.

The author, now retired, was a senior CIA official who served as CIA's Chief of Station in Laos and Saigon, as well as in other important assignments. Shackley feels that between diplomacy and war there is a third option -- paramilitary operations. This book concentrates on the counterinsurgency aspects of paramilitary operations. Shackley's chapters on the various progressive phases of such operations are each followed by a chapter illustrating that phase. Thus, he discusses the insurgencies of the Spanish Basques, El Salvador, the Western Sahara, and Angola, with other examples interwoven. This short volume, simply written, is a primer of the essential steps for effective counterinsurgency operations in areas important to the United States, as seen by the author in the light of his own extensive experience and study.

SHEVCHENKO, Arkady Nikolaevich. <u>Breaking With Moscow</u>. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. 378 p.

Shevchenko joined the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1956. From 1963-70, he was a senior official in the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, followed by three years as personal advisor to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, with the rank of Ambassador. In 1973, Schevchenko was appointed Under Secretary General of the United Nations for Political and Security Council Affairs - the highest ranking Soviet diplomat in the UN By 1970, Schevchenko began having doubts about the Soviet Secretariat. system. With his appointment as UN Under Secretary General, Soviet requirements on him to parrot their views, even though an international civil servant, and to cooperate with the KGB at the UN, led him to make an American contact in 1975 for the purpose of defecting. To his surprise, CIA asked him to remain for a time at his UN post as an agent-in-place, in particular supplying information to CIA on Soviet foreign policy making, disputes, and decisions, as well as on KGB operatives and methods in the U.S. for the FBI. In 1978, after almost three years of cooperation with intelligence, events made it advisable for Shevchenko to complete his defection, leaving the Soviet service and the UN for residence in the All of this is set forth in Shevchenko's excellent and important U.S. book, certainly one of the best of recent defector memoirs. He vividly describes, in the normal flow of events in his narrative, his mental turmoil in first approaching the Americans; his fears of the dangers of being a defector-in-place; and his final defection. Many pages are devoted to valuable comments on the roles of the KGB and GRU, not only in the Soviet hierarchy, but particularly their use of positions within the UN Secretariat and the Soviet Mission to the UN for purposes of espionage. Beyond this, Shevchenko presents a worthwhile study of Soviet policy and how it is made, as well as insights on the Soviet governmental elite. The latter material is important for all intelligence analysts of Soviet affairs, as well as for scholars in this field.

SHULTZ, Richard H. and Roy Godson. <u>Dezinformatsia</u>: <u>Active Measures in Soviet Strategy</u>. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984. Preface by Sidney Hook. Bibl. notes (at end of chapters). 211 p. (pap. same imprint).

This book on Soviet active measures has been well received knowledgeable students of the subject. Written in straightforward, readable prose, larded with many examples of these Soviet actions, it is of value for the intelligence officer, members of the academic community, journalists, and the general public. The book commences with a short description of the Soviet structure and techniques for propaganda, both overt and covert. Emphasizing the period 1960-1980, it then discusses Soviet overt propaganda themes, partly through content analysis, and shows how these themes are targeted by covert political techniques (in large measure through KGB handling) in such fields as international front organizations, agents of influence, and forgeries. The authors describe at some length the important case of the French journalist-agent of influence Pierre-Charles Pathé, whose efforts in this field ended up with his imprisonment by the French in 1979. Chapter V is given over to interviews, in question and answer form, with two major defectors in the field of active measures - Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB officer operating Soviet active measures in Japan, and Ladislav Bittman, (q.v.), a Czech intelligence officer with extensive experience in dezinformatsia.

SIGL, Rupert. In the Claws of the KGB: Memoirs of a Double Agent. Ardmore, Pa.: Dorrance & Co., 1978. 247 p. No index.

Vividly written, rich in case details and insights, this is an important contribution to the literature of recent Soviet security and intelligence activity. Sigl was an Austrian who was recruited by the Soviets in the late 40's for agent work in his homeland. Compromised in the early 50's, he was flown out to Moscow, trained, and shifted to work in-and-from East Berlin against American and other targets in West Germany until he defected to American intelligence in 1969. The book is a sobering reminder and updating of the Soviet (and Bloc) commitment to the clandestine agent as the operational way of life.

SMITH, R. Harris. OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1972. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 458 p. (pap. N. Y.: Dell, 1973; Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1981, with new preface by the author).

This book was the most comprehensive story of OSS when published, and it still has merits. New material, official and unofficial, now available may partially diminish its utility or at least make room for further research. With access to virtually no classified files, the author has had to rely on the fading memories of many of the participants, as well as some rather inadequate published literature on the subject. This results

in some errors of fact, which, taken with some biased views of the author, make for uneven reading. Therefore, the book must be read with some caution.

SMITH, Thomas B. The Other Establishment: An in-depth study of what individual life is really like in Communist-controlled countries. Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1984. Bibl. notes (at end of chapters). Bibl. 205 p.

This book is virtually unique in the published literature of intelligence. It sets forth, with examples, the basic documents which Soviet citizens must carry; these are administrative devices by which the Soviets control the lives of the populace. The author relates these controls to the force of the internal police and legal codes which stand behind them. Not only does Smith present the descriptive data of these basic documents for living in the USSR, but he also includes forty six photographs of the actual Soviet (and some Bloc) documents themselves. These have been cleared for the author by the Central Intelligence Agency, (in some cases lightly sanitized). Among the documents described are the basic identity document - the PASPORT -, and those for military reserve status, Party membership, employment and union affiliation. Smith notes the inclusion in these documents of such vital statistical data as addresses, birth, marital status, and education. In the last chapter, the author describes the strikingly similar documentation among the Communist Bloc countries, again with illustrations cleared by the CIA.

SNEPP, Frank. Decent Interval: An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End. New York: Random House, 1977. 590 p. (pap. N. Y.: Vintage Books, 1978).

This is a highly controversial book by a CIA intelligence analyst who served in Saigon in the closing period of the Vietnamese war. The author tries to place the blame for the last disorderly days of the war and failure to evacuate many Vietnamese collaborators of the U.S. on CIA's Chief of Station and the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, as well as on Secretary of State Kissinger and President Ford. The book contains many alleged inaccuracies and distortions, nor was Snepp in a position to be privy to all of the elements of the senior decisions of which he writes. Despite Snepp's assurance to the Director of Central Intelligence and others that he would submit his manuscript for security review, he failed to do so, and the book was edited for publication in great secrecy. The U.S. government prosecuted Snepp for violation of the latter's secrecy agreement, a position upheld by the Supreme Court. As a result, the government was awarded all of Snepp's profits from this publication.

* SOLZHENITSYN, Alexander I. <u>The Gulag Archipelago</u>, 1918-1956. Vols. I-III. New York: Harper & Row, 1973/74/78, 660 p., 712 p., 558 p.

"Gulag I" provided the historical background of institutionalized terror established by Lenin and generalized by Stalin. "Gulag II" details the primary medium of this terror, the slave labor camps. "Gulag III" is the concluding, and the for the non-specialist, the most readable volume of this Dantean literary investigation and record of the impact on Russia and the Russians of the Communist Party system. Solzhenitsyn deals here with the Corrective Labor Camps and their State Security (KGB) and Party masters in the period of mature Stalinism (1945-1953). This book is an important record. It reveals that the breakdown of the Camp regime began before Stalin's death, that the quick structural and other adaptations under Khrushchev were essentially cosmetic and palliative, and that there has been a creeping Stalinist recidivism under Brezhnev. preceding works, "Gulag III" is replete with extraordinary detail (the account of the popular rising in the city of Novocherkussk, 2 June 1962, pp. 506-514, has been told nowhere else in public print in this detail). With an eye given only to the poet and good craftsman, Solzhenitsyn puts the whole point of the Trilogy into his very last lines: "For half a century and more the enormous state has towered over us, girded with hoops of steel. The hoops are still there. There is no law."

SQUIRE, P. S. The Third Department: The Political Police in the Russia of Nicholas I. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Bibl. 272 p.

Similar in some respects to the Monas book, (q.v.), The Third Department by Dr. Squire is a more in-depth study of the secret police of Nicholas I, with less social commentary. Recommended especially for those seeking a deeper understanding of the traditions and \underline{modus} $\underline{operandi}$ of the Tsarist and succeeding Soviet security organizations.

STANLEY, <u>Col.</u> Roy M., II, <u>USAF</u>. <u>World War II Photo Intelligence</u>. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1981. Foreword by Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. Bibl. 374 p.

Colonel Stanley has had considerable post-World War II experience in imagery intelligence, and the development of computer data systems in the imagery field. This book is a history of the development of photo intelligence and interpretation in World War II (with some material on the years preceding). It is copiously illustrated with over five hundred photographs appropriate to the text. While essentially a "coffee table" book, it has merit for the historically minded professional intelligence officer.

STEAD, Philip John. <u>Second Bureau</u>. London: Evans Brothers, 1959. Source notes. 212 p.

A history of the regular French military intelligence service during World War II, comprising the Deuxième Bureau and its supporting organizations for clandestine collection and counterespionage. Based on French-language accounts and on conversations with many officers of the service, it shows the difficulty experienced in financing and maintaining programs after 1940 in doubly clandestine operations, secret from both the Germans and the Vichy Government.

STERN, Philip. <u>Secret Missions of the Civil War</u>. Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1959. 320 p. No index.

First-hand accounts by men and women engaged in Civil War intelligence missions woven into a continuous narrative and introduced by an excellent Civil War historian.

STEVENSON, William. A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976. Foreword by Sir William Stephenson. Historical note by Charles H. Ellis. 486 p. (pap. N. Y.: Ballantine Books, 1977).

This book describes the activities of Sir William Stephenson (code-name, Intrepid, and no relation of the author) as head of British Security Coordination (BSC) in New York during World War II. BSC directed British intelligence activities in the Western Hemisphere. Stephenson was a major intelligence figure during the war. His close personal friendship with William J. Donovan was marked by the assistance Intrepid gave Donovan leading up to the establishment of (and subsequent close collaboration with) the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). This book has been severely attacked by knowledgeable reviewers as inaccurate in many respects, badly documented and grossly inflated. Because of its vulnerability to challenge, it should be approached with caution by the professional intelligence officer. (For a more detailed and balanced account of BSC operations, q.v. Hyde, Room 3603.

STOCKWELL, John. In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1978. 285 p.

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Stockwell served for twelve years as a CIA case officer, largely in Africa. He was the Chief of CIA's Angola Task Force, 1975-76. In this book, he tries to describe some of what he terms CIA's "scandalous, absurd operations." He is persuaded that clandestine services are not "essential to our national security." This book is part of the "literature of attack" on CIA and intelligence, showing some of the author's biases and disenchantment with his former employer. Stockwell did not submit his manuscript to CIA for security review prior to publication, as his secrecy

agreement requires. As a result, his unspent profits are forfeit to the government.

STRONG, Major-General Sir Kenneth W. D. <u>Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer</u>. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1969. Bibl. 366 p.

General Strong was a career British military intelligence officer who served as G-2 for General Eisenhower during World War II. After the war, he founded and became the first Director of the British Joint Intelligence Bureau. Subsequently, he became the first Director-General of Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence. This book relates General Strong's experiences during his intelligence career, his views of the role of intelligence in government, and important insights into the profession. It is written with great discretion in order to avoid any breach of security, and does not take into account any use of Ultra material.

STRONG, Major-General Sir Kenneth W. D. Men of Intelligence: A Study of the Roles and Decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence from World War I to the Present Day. London: Cassell, 1970. (Distributed in U.S. by St. Martin's Press, N. Y.). Bibl. 183 p.

An historical review of a dozen intelligence leaders from WWI to the recent past by a senior and knowledgeable British intelligence officer. The author describes the successes and failures of a selected group of German, French, British, and American intelligence chiefs, most of whom he knew personally. His emphasis is on the need for centralized direction of intelligence and the necessity for close coordination between intelligence chiefs and policymakers.

SUN TZU. The Art of War. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963. Foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart. Preface by Samuel B. Griffith. Bibl. 197 p.

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General Samuel B. Griffith's translation of this early military work is highly recommended in view of the influence of Sun Tzu on Chinese leaders through Mao Tse-tung and his generals. Griffith dates the writing to the period 400-320 B.C. Chapter XIII on "Employment of Secret Agents" is itself a classic in early intelligence literature, as are the author's references to deception.

SUVOROV, Viktor, (pseud.). <u>Inside Soviet Military Intelligence</u>. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984. 193 p.

Suvorov, a former Soviet Army officer writing pseudonymously, has written this book on the GRU - Soviet military intelligence - a subject on which little appears in the open literature, particularly of a fairly contemporary nature. The author writes as an "insider", but whether his access was only that of an Army officer, or on whether Suvorov was a GRU officer himself, the book is silent. This volume contains many factual errors, misstatements, and extravagant claims, some of which may be due to carelessness or plain lack of knowledge. The author seems more sure of himself when he writes of the GRU Special Purpose Forces (SPETSNAZ) and tactical reconnaissance (Part Two, Chapters 7 and 8).

TAYLOR, John W. R. and David Monday. Spies in the Sky. New York: Scribners, 1972. 128 p.

A general discussion of aerial reconnaissance, from balloons to satellites, with emphasis on recent activities and capabilities up to the time of publication. Mr. Taylor produces the missile sections for the Jane's Fighting Ships and Aircraft publications.

THOMPSON, James Westfall and Saul K. Padover. <u>Secret Diplomacy</u>, <u>Espionage</u>, and <u>Cryptography 1500-1815</u>. New York: Frederick Ungar Pub. Co., 1963. Bibl. 290 p.

An engrossing history of 300 years of diplomatic duplicity in Europe and the operations of early intelligence services.

TINNIN, David B., with Dag Christensen. The Hit Team. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1976. 240 p. No index. (pap. N. Y.: Dell, 1977).

Tinnin, an associate editor for Time, and Christensen, a reporter for the Oslo Aftenposten, join in producing a highly readable journalistic documentary of an Israeli "hit team" operation in Norway in 1973. The authors trace the retaliation operation and its approval by the Israeli cabinet, after the slaughter of eleven members of Israel's Olympic Team in Munich, beginning with the formation of a select, specially trained, secretly documented search and surveillance team to seek out the leaders of the Black September terrorist movement in Europe and the Middle East. They prove successful with the first 12 "hits," but end in failure--and The functions of each squad are followed jail for some--with the 13th. operation: Avin-Search the and Surveillance. throughout Communications, Heth-Cover, Beth-Security and Exfiltration, and Aleph-the actual "hit team." The weaknesses of the operation, culminating in the murder of the wrong man, are critiqued. Not much more than the tip of the iceberg of the operation really comes through. Caution in reading is advised, as journalism overrides some factual errors and some poor operational tradecraft.

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TOWNSEND, Elias Carter. Risks: The Key to Combat Intelligence. Harrisburg, Pa: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1955. 82 p.

An analysis of combat intelligence and its relationship to the command and to the commander, presented within the context of "risk" theory and including interesting comments on capabilities, intentions and predictions.

TREPPER, Leopold. The Great Game: Memoirs of the Spy Hitler Couldn't Silence. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977. 442 p.

The author was founder and leader of the "Red Orchestra," - the Rote Kapelle - one of the most successful underground Soviet intelligence networks of the Second World War. Trepper served as an illegal Rezident in Belgium and France for the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate--Soviet military intelligence). Following the liberation of Paris, Trepper returned to Moscow (January 1945) only to be incarcerated in Lubyanka Prison for over nine years (released May 1954). Trepper's revelations, particularly as to his own role, may be highly selective. (q.v. Hohne, Codeword: Direktor: The Story of the Red Orchestra, and Central Intelligence Agency, The Rote Kapelle).

* TREVOR-ROPER, Hugh. <u>The Philby Affair</u>. London: Kimber, 1968. 126 p. No index.

The Philby case is examined in an excellent and perceptive essay by a distinguished British historian who was in the British Secret Intelligence Service in World War II. The book also includes an interesting essay on Admiral Canaris, Abwehr chief under Hitler.

* TROY, Thomas F. <u>Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency.</u> Washington: Central Intelligence Agency. Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1981. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 589 p. (Commercial publication, Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1981).

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This volume is a study of the development of the concept of centralized intelligence in America, 1939-47. The author has had access to large numbers of the classified documents on this subject from the military intelligence services and the JCS, as well as those of OSS, CIA and the Many have been declassified or sanitized for this book, which was originally produced in CIA in classified form. Troy describes the internecine warfare as old-line intelligence organizations (particularly G-2 and the FBI) battled for their own turf and tried to block the newlyorganized OSS and subsequently the establishment of CIG and CIA. for documentation this book has been brilliantly researched Presidential libraries, as well as in the sources noted above and through personal interviews. The excellent writing makes it essential reading for those wishing to learn of this subject matter; the book is important for the professional intelligence officer and scholars in general.

TUCHMAN, Barbara W. The Zimmerman Telegram. New York: Viking Press, 1958. Source notes. Bibl. 244 p. (pap. N. Y.: Bantam Books, 1971).

A recounting of one of the most significant achievements in cryptanalysis during WWI which was a major element in bringing the U.S. into the war. Readable and well documented, this book provides an outstanding example of the impact of intelligence activities on the course of history. (For a shorter account, q.v. Beesly, Room 40).

TULLY, Andrew. <u>CIA: The Inside Story</u>. New York: William Morrow, 1962. 276 p. (pap. Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett Crest Book, 1963).

This book was the first American full-length, purportedly factual, expose of CIA and its activities. As Director Dulles wrote Tully's publisher, the work is "a compilation of rumor, hearsay and republication of previously published speculation about the CIA ... it contains gross inaccuracies and distortions."

UNGAR, Sanford J. FBI. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976. Bibl. 682 p.

This book is an account, by a well known writer, of the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The author had the cooperation (if not the blessing) of Clarence M. Kelley, Director of the FBI, and some of his senior associates. Ungar interviewed many then present and former officials and agents of the FBI, and visited many of their Field Offices. However, this book is not by any means an "official" study. It is critical of many aspects of the Bureau's activities. Unfortunately for the author, it was published before much of the testimony appeared in 1975-76 before various Congressional committees which went into great detail on many of the Bureau's operations in the internal security area.

* U.S. COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. Report to the President. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1975. 299 p.

This is the report, findings, and recommendations of President Ford's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, chaired by Vice President Rockefeller. The Commission was established, following allegations in the press and elsewhere, to determine whether any domestic CIA activities exceeded the Agency's statutory authority. This is a clear and detailed account of CIA's activities in the domestic field, particularly in the light of the times and circumstances in which they occurred. It is important for the professional intelligence officer.

U.S. COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY. (Report of the Commission). Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1975. 278 p.

The Murphy Commission (named for its chairman, Ambassador Robert D. Murphy) submitted its final report to President Ford and both houses of the Congress on 27 June 1975, almost three years after the original act which commissioned it. The study looks at the entirety of foreign policy, including the national role of intelligence. Chapter 7, titled "The Organization of Intelligence," describes the community that existed in 1975, before Executive Order 11905 of February 1976 was issued. Fourteen specific changes in intelligence were recommended. Some of the changes have since been adopted, some have been overtaken by events, and some have been ignored. Several volumes of appendices to the Report contain articles prepared by scholars and experts from various fields. Appendix U, in Volume 7, includes the seven articles of value to the intelligence professional.

* U.S. CONGRESS. HOUSE. PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.

This Committee was created in July 1977 by H. Res. 658, a year after its Senate counterpart, to carry out House of Representatives' oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States. While much of its early activities involved the Committee's own organization and briefings on the many facets involved in the U.S. Intelligence Community, its first Report to the House (House Report No. 95-1795, dated 14 October 1978) contains interesting material. Included is an extensive glossary of intelligence terms and definitions—a matter of considerable professional interest. The <u>Hearings</u> and <u>Reports</u> of this Committee on a variety of intelligence intelligence legislative proposals (including budgetary and authorizations) are and will continue to be essential reading for the professional intelligence officer, as well as those profession. While these Reports and Hearings are now too numerous to list here, attention might well be drawn to the often quoted Hearings held in February 1980 and published under the title "Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)."

U.S. CONGRESS. HOUSE. SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE. Recommendations of the Final Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. (House Report No. 94-833). Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976.

The House Select Committee on Intelligence (established to investigate alleged misdeeds by various elements of the Intelligence Community and generally known as the "Pike Committee"), did not issue a final report, due to disagreements with the Executive Branch over the Committee's desire to include information in the report which the Executive Branch considered classified. The House voted not to issue the report until the disagreements had been resolved; it has not been formally issued. However, a copy of one of the drafts of the report was leaked to a member

of the media and was published, without authorization, in a New York weekly newspaper, The Village Voice, 16 and 23 February 1976. (A British edition of this text, with an introduction by Philip Agee, has been published in book form for the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, under title: CIA: The Pike Report, Nottingham, England: Spokesman Books, 1977). The House Select Committee did publish its Recommendations in House Report No. 94-833. In addition, it published six volumes of unclassified Hearings, as follows:

- Part 1. U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Costs and Fiscal Procedures.
- Part 2. <u>U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: The Performance of the Intelligence Community</u>.
- Part 3. <u>U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Domestic Intelligence Programs</u>.
- Part 4. <u>U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Committee</u>

 <u>Proceedings.</u>
- Part 5. <u>U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks and Control of Foreign Intelligence</u>.
- Part 6. U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Committee Proceedings--II.

These <u>Hearings</u>, chaired by Congressman Otis Pike, surrounded by controversy from their inception, do not have the depth or balance of the Senate Select Committee <u>Hearings</u> noted on p. 78. However, they should receive the study of professional intelligence officers.

* U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.

This Committee was created in May 1976 by S. Res. 400 to carry out the Senate's oversight function of the intelligence activities of the United States. While much of the first year's activities involved the Committee's own organization and briefings on the many facets involved in the U.S. Intelligence Community, its first Report to the Senate (Senate Report No. 95-217, dated 18 May 1977) is replete with discussions of such problems as intelligence and the rights of Americans, electronic surveillance legislation, covert action, the problems of secrecy and classification, and charters and guidelines for the components of the Community. The Hearings and Reports of this Committee on a variety of intelligence matters and intelligence legislative proposals (including budgetary authorizations) are and will continue to be essential reading for the professional intelligence officer, as well as those outside the profession. However, these Reports and Hearings are now too numerous to list separately here.

* U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. Final Report and Hearings. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975-76.

The <u>Final Report</u> (Senate Report No. 94-755) of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, chaired by Senator Frank Church, comprises six Books as follows:

Book I. Foreign and Military Intelligence.

Book II. Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans.

Book III. Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans.

Book IV. Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence and Military Intelligence.

Book V. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies.

Book VI. Supplementary Reports on Intelligence Activities.

An <u>Interim Report</u> by the Committee, entitled <u>Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders</u> (Senate Report No. 94-465) was issued in November 1975.## A Committee <u>Staff Report</u>, entitled <u>Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973</u>, was also issued in 1975. Much of the testimony taken by this Committee remains classified and will not be published. However, seven volumes of unclassified <u>Hearings</u> have been published, entitled as follows:

- Vol. 1 <u>Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents</u>.
- Vol. 2 Huston Plan.
- Vol. 3 Internal Revenue Service.
- Vol. 4 Mail Opening.
- Vol. 5 The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights.
- Vol. 6 Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- Vol. 7 Covert Action.

These Reports and Hearings comprise the most thorough investigation of United States intelligence activities, foreign and domestic, ever undertaken by the Congress. The Hearings grew out of charges published in the public media commencing in December 1974. Many of these were inaccurate or overdrawn. The bulk of the original charges related to alleged domestic operations of the CIA and were considered by the U.S. Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (q.v.). The Senate Select Committee Reports and Hearings cover in particular CIA, the intelligence components of the Defense and State Departments, the FBI, and the intelligence activities of the White House and the Internal Revenue Service. It is a major piece of work which should be studied by all professional intelligence officers, especially in their own particular areas of assignment or interest.

Book IV contains the "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," expanded and revised from a shorter version in Book I. The full version

of the "History" in Book IV, by Anne Karalekas of the Committee Staff, was published commercially in 1977 by the Aegean Park Press, P.O. Box 2837, Laguna Hills, California, 92653. While somewhat biased and uneven in some areas, particularly on the role of clandestine collection and covert action, this "History" is probably the best text publicly available on the history of CIA.

This Report has also been issued commercially, under the same title, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1976.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DFFENSE. The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. (This work, numbered Vols. I-V, actually consists of eight volumes, as Vols II-IV each consist of a volume of text and an Appendix volume). Vols. separately paged, totalling 3010 p. Complete index in Vol. V.

These volumes cover the period from 14 February - 7 December 1941. major centerpiece comprises the instructions and preparations for each of the meetings between Secretary of State Hull and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Admiral Nomura, but much other material is included. decrypted text of the available Japanese messages during this period has been declassified and published here. Another integral part of this work is the lengthy historical material in textual form taken from Secretary Hull's official memoranda and memoirs, as well as the Japanese position on given matters. The Hull-Nomura centerpiece comprises Part A in each Parts B and C deal with Japanese espionage activities in the Western Hemisphere and Japanese diplomatic relations at the time worldwide respectively. Vols. II-IV are purely textual, based on the material described above, and appropriately footnoted to the decrypted Japanese messages. The Appendices to Vols. II-IV contain full decrypted texts of the Japanese messages involved in each of these volumes. Vols. I and V contain both text and decryptions. This work is hardly "bedside" reading, but as an historical source, it is virtually unequaled for material of this kind.

* U.S. WAR DEPARTMENT. STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT. War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services). New York: Walker and Company, 1976. Two Volumes. Both vols. contain new introductions by Kermit Roosevelt. Vol. I, 261 p. Index; Vol. II, 460 p. No index.

In July 1941, President Roosevelt established the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), headed by Mr. (later Major General) William J. Donovan. It was America's first attempt at a comprehensive intelligence organization. In June 1942, COI was renamed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and placed under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the war, as of 1 October 1945, President Truman dissolved the OSS, assigning its research and analysis elements to the Department of State and its operational and administrative units to the War Department, where they were renamed the Strategic Services Unit (SSU).

SSU was transferred to the newly created Central Intelligence Group in 1946 and ultimately to the latter's successor organization, CIA. At the direction of Admiral Leahy on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, SSU prepared, for highly restricted dissemination, a Top Secret, two volume War Report of the organization and operations of COI/OSS. volumes have now been lightly sanitized by CIA in response to a Freedom of Information Act request and published commercially. The original writing of the War Report was done by a staff under the direction of an OSS veteran, Kermit Roosevelt. Volume I comprises the history of COI and the organizational history of OSS; Volume II comprises the overseas operational activities of OSS. This publication is just what its title says it is--a War Report. It is not a detailed history. Its greatest shortcoming, as Mr. Roosevelt states in his original preface, is the virtual total absence of the names of the participants in the organization and those operations described. This was deliberate, (for security reasons), but eliminates the real flesh and blood of history. Nevertheless, this is an important and authoritative work - a take off point for further study and writings. It should be noted that a one volume paperback edition of the War Report, edited by Anthony Cave Brown, has been published (New York: Berkley Medallion Book, 1976). However, this is an edited version, eliminating and rearranging some of the material. In particular, the material on OSS in the Far East is not included in the paperback version.

* VAGTS, Alfred. The Military Attache. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1967. Bibl. foctnotes. Bibl. 408 p.

An excellent treatment of the role of the attaché by an author who has done extensive writing and research in military, defense and diplomatic affairs. He discusses both the history of the service attaché and his functions, past and present.

VOSJOLI, Philippe L. Thyraud de. <u>Lamia</u>. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970. 344 p.

The memoirs of a French career intelligence officer who served in the French Resistance during World War II, and who was the liaison officer of the French Intelligence Service (SDECE) in Washington at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The book gives some important insights into the French Intelligence Service. A fictionalized version of a part of Lamia, under the title of Topaz, written by Leon Uris, preceded it and was made into a movie.

WALTERS, <u>Lieutenant General</u> Vernon A. <u>Silent Missions</u>. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1978. 654 p.

Walters enlisted as a private in the U.S. Army at the beginning of World War II and retired in 1976 from the position of Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence. During those years, he had a unique intelligence career as a military and defense attache, as an interpreter at many high level meetings between U.S. Presidents (and other senior government officials) and foreign leaders; and many special assignments based not only on his great discretion but also on his fine acumen and incredible command of foreign languages. As Defense Attache in Paris, he was able to infiltrate and exfiltrate Henry Kissinger (then Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) in and out of Paris well over a dozen times for secret talks with the North Vietnamese. In addition, General Walters held several meetings with the Chinese in Paris leading up to President Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972. He also includes a chapter on the CIA's rejection of White House attempts to involve him and CIA in the Watergate cover-up. This book contains many footnotes to history and is written with all of General Walters' brilliance as a raconteur.

WEBER, Ralph E. <u>United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers 1775-1938</u>. Chicago: Precedent Publishing Inc., 1979. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 633 p.

Prof. Weber of Marquette University has written a scholarly volume on the history of U.S. diplomatic codes and ciphers. Starting with those in use during the era of the American Revolution, he continues in detail down to the Civil War. Somewhat less material is described for the remainder of the nineteenth century; and there is minimal description of twentieth century U.S. cryptologic matters for reasons of security. The Appendix comprises almost 350 pages of this volume and sets forth U.S. code tables of the Revolutionary period and those in use in the early nineteeth century.

WEINSTEIN, Allen. <u>Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case</u>. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 674 p. (pap. N. Y.: Vintage Books, 1979, with revisions).

Weinstein, then a professor of history at Smith College, has written the most comprehensive study to date of the case of Alger Hiss, a former senior State Department official. In this, the author was aided by the declassification and release of thousands of pages of formerly classified government documents about the case. Weinstein began his work in the belief that Hiss had been unjustly convicted of perjury in the latter's denial of communist activities (including espionage) on his part. When Weinstein had ended his research, he was convinced that Hiss was guilty. It is an important study of a major case of communist espionage in the U.S. in the 1930's and 1940's. (All relevant citations to the extensive Congressional testimony surrounding the Hiss-Chambers case, are to be found in this book). (q.v. Chambers).

WEST, Rebecca. The New Meaning of Treason. New York: The Viking Press, 1964. 374 p. (Revised pap. N. Y.: Viking, 1967).

Dame Rebecca West has revised and updated her <u>The Meaning of Treason</u>. Her incisive accounts of the psychology and motivations of celebrated (mostly British) spies, traitors, and defectors are extremely valuable. The conclusions warrant close reading. Among the cases discussed are William Joyce, John Amery, Dr. Alan Nunn May, Dr. Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, and George Blake. There is emphasis on the poor government security in many of the cases involved.

WHALEY, Barton. <u>Codeword Barbarossa</u>. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1973. Bibl. 376 p. (Pap. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974).

A provocative analysis of the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union with several interesting features: the role of deception; an elaboration of the Wohlstetter concept of "signals" and "noise" in the field of warning intelligence; a fascinating look at pre-WWII intelligence operations, especially in the area of communications intelligence; and a new interpretation of the Soviet view of pre-war German offensive preparations. Even without agreeing with all his interpretations, Whaley's book has much to offer the serious student of intelligence.

WHITEHEAD, Don. The FBI Story: A Report to the People. New York: Random House, 1956. Foreword by J. Edgar Hoover. Notes. 368 p.

Although now somewhat dated, Whitehead provides a relatively comprehensive and solid treatment of FBI history through the mid-1950's. The book conveys a favorable impression of the FBI's activities and accomplishments.

* WHITESIDE, Thomas. An Agent in Place: The Wennerström Affair. New York: Viking Press, 1966. 150 p. (pap. N. Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1983).

The best available, and well-written, unofficial account of Colonel Stig Wennerström, Swedish career Air Force officer, who provided intelligence to the Soviets for 15 years until his arrest by the Swedes in 1963. His espionage activities in the U.S. and Sweden caused significant damage to both NATO and the Swedish defense establishments. (For greater detail, see the official Swedish Judicial and Parliamentary Commissions' reports on the case).

U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE. INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. Report. The Wennerstroem Spy Case. Excerpts From the Testimony of Stig Eric Constans Wennerstroem, A Noted Soviet Agent. 1964. pp. 1-168.

WILENSKY, Harold L. <u>Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government & Industry</u>. New York: Basic Books, 1967. Bibl. 226 p. (pap. N. Y.: Basic Books, 1967).

The use and misuse of intelligence in government and business organizations are discussed by a sociologist. Heavy reading and does not truly accomplish the objectives desired. However, as one of the few books on the general "theory" of intelligence, it is considered of interest and value.

WINTERBOTHAM, Frederick W. The Ultra Secret. New York: Harper & Row, 1974. 199 p. (pap. N. Y.: Dell. 1975, 1982).

The most carefully concealed intelligence secret of World War II. and for many years thereafter, was the fact that the British had broken most of the German ciphers, and in particular were reading high-level German material encrypted on the Enigma machine. This major communications intelligence triumph (the product of which received the code word Ultra) played a significant role in the Allied victories. Former RAF Group Captain Winterbotham was an officer in the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) and was responsible for developing security procedures for the liaison units which handled Ultra material in England and in senior headquarters in the field. His is the first book in English to reveal the story in such detail. The historical implications of Winterbotham's revelations still remain to be put into focus, debated and digested, particularly in the light of many errors in the book, both of fact and self-aggrandizement. (q.v. Beesly, Calvocoressi, Hinsley, Jones, Lewin, Montagu).

WISE, David and Thomas B. Ross. The Espionage Establishment. New York: Random House, 1967. 308 p. (pap. N. Y.: Bantam, 1968).

Discusses espionage systems of U.S., Great Britain, USSR, and China. The section on the CIA is weak; however the chapter on the British intelligence services reveals considerably more than had been previously published. Comments on the Chinese intelligence services and activities are of little or no value.

WISE, David and Thomas B. Ross. The Invisible Government. New York: Random House, 1964. Bibl. notes. 375 p. (Pap. N. Y.: Bantam Books, 1965; N. Y.: Vintage Books, 1974).

An inaccurate, simplistic "exposé" of the CIA by two resourceful journalists. Overstates influence of CIA. Exploited by unfriendly nations for anti-American propaganda purposes. (Russian and Cuban editions of this book were also published).

* WOHLSTETTER, Roberta. <u>Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision</u>. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1962. Foreword by Thomas E. Schelling. Bibl. 426 p. (pap. same publ.).

A classic case study of a surprise attack which succeeded because of a major intelligence failure. Its value lies not only in the analysis of the intelligence background of the Pearl Harbor attack, but also on vital questions of intelligence estimates, alerts, and indications and warning systems which the author presents in depth to illustrate her views of this historic event.

WOLIN, Simon and Robert M. Slusser, eds. The Soviet Secret Police. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1964. (reissue of original 1957 Praeger edition). Bibl. 408 p.

One of the better works on the Soviet intelligence and security services and a "core" book essential to further study of the subject. Wolin and Slusser had intended that their work serve as a point of departure for encouraging more studies of the subject in greater depth and breadth. Writing in the December 1973 Slavic Review, Slusser laments "that this hope has not been realized." To this day, serious open study of the Soviet secret police is seldom encountered, with the exception of a few good works such as Barron's KGB and KGB Today (q.v.).

WOODHOUSE, Christopher Montague. The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949. London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1976. Bibl. notes. Bibl. 324 p. (An updated account of his Apple of Discord, 1948).

An authoritative account of the Greek Resistance in World War II and the internal postwar civil war which the Resistance helped to spawn, with emphasis on the political background. Colonel Woodhouse, a distinguished British historian with extensive intelligence experience, commanded the Allied Military Mission to the Greek guerrillas during the War. For a shorter account of Woodhouse's experiences in Greece in World War II, as well as his post-war intelligence assignments, see his autobiography, Something Ventured. (London: Granada, 1982).

WRISTON, Henry Merritt. <u>Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations</u>. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929. (Reprinted Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith Publishers, 1967). 874 p.

This voluminous and scholarly work was originally issued as one of the Albert Shaw lectures on Diplomatic History, the 1923 series of which provided Dr. Wriston the opportunity to review the historical and legal foundations of the executive agent, including the intelligence agent, from the period of the Continental Congress through the late 19th century. Wriston establishes that the use of executive agents is coterminous with the history of our nation, and might be considered to precede it in the

intelligence arena because of the efforts of George Washington and the Continental Congress. Detailed examples are presented of intelligence collection, covert action, covert procurement, protection of sources and methods—in fact, all the problems faced by the intelligence community today—and the Constitutional basis and precedents of each. The use of covert funding and the unsuccessful Congressional challenge to it in the last century are fully described. This book is essential to the proper understanding of the historical and legal basis of present-day American intelligence systems.

WYDEN, Peter. <u>Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story</u>. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979. Bibl. notes. 352 p.

The views on this book are as varied as the opinions of those who have commented on it or who participated in one way or another in the Bay of Pigs operation. The author's views that CIA was "acting out of control" and "routinely, daily, committing unconstitutional acts ..." are debatable; and the book is flawed by errors. Nevertheless, there are those who consider this the best book on the subject. It is written in an easy, chatty style, reflecting the author's journalistic background. He has interviewed many of the participants and spent several hours with Castro discussing the operation. Those who read it should approach this volume with circumspection. For those wishing to read the (slightly) sanitized official post-mortem report of the committee chaired by General Maxwell Taylor, see: Operation Zapata (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1981).

WYNNE, Greville. Contact on Gorky Street. New York: Atheneum, 1968. 222 p.

A British agent's first-hand, though somewhat colored, account of his missions to Moscow to contact Colonel Penkovskiy. This book, read as a companion-piece to The Penkovskiy Papers (q.v.), provides a fuller appreciation of this remarkable intelligence operation.

X, Mr., with Bruce E. Henderson and C. C. Cyr. <u>Double Eagle: the Autobiography of a Polish Spy Who Defected to the West.</u> Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1979. 227 p. (pap. N. Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1983).

The story, at points crudely and tastelessly written, is of a Polish Security Service (UB) Lieutenant Colonel who was recruited in Norway where he worked in place from 1964 until 1967 when he defected to the U.S. Personal, familial, and nationalist concerns have apparently soured him and make it difficult to judge his motives and acts. Despite its reticences and self-legitimizing declamations, the book is the only current window in the public literature into the organization, selection, training, and the operational flavor of UB life, including the workings of the Soviet advisor system. (q.v. Monat, Spy in the U.S.).

* YARDLEY, Herbert O. The American Black Chamber. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1931. 375 p. (pap. N. Y.: Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library, 1981).

Yardley, originally a cipher clerk in the State Department, became the officer in charge of the code and cipher section in Military Intelligence in the U.S. Army in World War I. After the war, with State and War Department funds, Yardley established what came to be known as the American Black Chamber. His career there came to an end in 1929 when Secretary of State Stimson closed the Black Chamber. This book describes Yardley's work in the cryptologic field. Some have suggested that this volume contains exaggerations and inaccuracies which may require some additional study to ascertain pro or con. The book's importance still cannot be denied.

ZACHARIAS, Rear Admiral Ellis M. Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946. 433 p.

Zacharias was deeply involved in U.S. Naval Intelligence operations before and during WWII. The book includes discussion of pre-WWII espionage activities and of the U.S. Navy's psychological warfare campaign against Japan.

An Introduction to Intelligence Fiction

A frequent inclination among intellgence professionals is to disregard the benefits, utility, or plain enjoyment of intelligence fiction. The escapades of James Bond, his less glamorous predecessors, and his subsequent imitators, understandably stretch the credibility of the genre and make it an easy matter to write it off as shallow, escapist, and of little or no value.

While difficult to rationalize the often poor writing and the distorted picture of intelligence which frequently characterize intelligence fiction, one should not be blinded to the potential benefits and pleasures which reside in a discriminating reading of this literature.

Why should the intelligence professional read and be concerned with intelligence fiction? First of all, the public image of the intelligence community is partially molded by the impressions conveyed in contemporary The readers see only the mystery, glamour, and allure of secret intelligence operations and are apparently willing to buy large numbers of books which describe these attributes. The fictional literature unfortunately conveys an inaccurate image of the world of intelligence which the public does not disregard when issues of real-life intelligence operations are debated. While we cannot change totally the public's image of intelligence service, we can at least be aware of this perception. On a more personal basis, intelligence fiction can furnish ideas and interests which occasionally could be professionally rewarding - particularly when the fiction being read has a factual basis. Leon Uris' <u>Topaz</u>, for instance, was a well-received novel and motion picture. It was not until after publication that it became known that the novel was based - to a great extent - on the activities of a real-life French intelligence officer; a reading of de Vosjoli's Lamia (q.v.) would prove rather rapidly the validity of much of the Topaz story. Similarly, the real-life intelligence classic by Ewen Montagu, The Man Who Never Was, had its fictional predecessor in Alfred Duff Cooper's Operation Heartbreak. interested reader can examine the connection between these two stories, one historical, the other supposedly fiction, and draw his own conclusion.

Not only will the reader find that intelligence fiction is sometimes based on actual events, or the author's personal experiences, but also that it is Occasionally, as in the case of Somerset Maugham's excellent literature. Ashenden or the British Agent, a book will have both characteristics. renowned novelist, a British intelligence officer in Europe during WWI, wrote a thinly disguised, fictionalized version of his experiences which would be considered an excellent novel by any standards. While such realism is not widespread in the world of intelligence fiction, it may be surprising to note the number of well-known authors who have operated in the murky world of espionage. Two of the better known are Daniel Defoe of Robinson Crusoe fame, whose lengthy writings never revealed his extensive intelligence activities on behalf of the English Crown, and Christopher Marlowe, who may have lost his life, according to several scholars, while on an intelligence mission for Walsingham, although recent writings tend to deny this. In current times, Ian Fleming served as assistant to the Director of British Naval Intelligence in WWII, and John Le Carre was an intelligence professional.

For the reader interested in intelligence fiction, the writings of Graham Greene (who served in intelligence in WWII) and the anthology by the late DCI. Allen Dulles, (Great Spy Stories from Fiction, New York: Harper and Row. 1969), would be a useful start. Dulles made an effort to include material not generally found in anthologies of intelligence fiction. In the opinion of some writers, the genre in America starts with James Fenimore Cooper's The Spy (1821); others prefer the Irish writer Erskine Childers' The Riddle of the Sands (1903); and of course there is the amusing Water on the Brain by Compton Mackenzie, originally suppressed by the British in 1933 but re-published twenty years later. Mackenzie had served in British intelligence in World War I. In any event, the reader will meet authors John Buchan, E. Phillips Oppenheim, Joseph Conrad, Eric Ambler, William Buckley, Jr. and Charles McCarry, (the latter two with CIA experience), and many others. One can note the development of the genre from Childers' first effort to the polished novels of Eric Ambler, such as the recently published The Levanter; or go beyond the individual books and contrast the different worlds of intelligence as portrayed by Fleming and Le Carre. One can compare Joseph Conrad's wellknown The Secret Agent with what many intelligence professionals consider Conrad's better piece of intelligence fiction, <u>Under Western Eyes</u>. combat intelligence neglected in books such as <u>William W. Haines'</u> Haines' Command Decision. Haines was a skilled air combat intelligence officer in Europe in World War II.

More recently (1980), The Spike, a fascinating novel on Soviet journalistic disinformation by Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss, has been high on the best seller lists. It is unique in this field, and many readers have attempted to connect it with real-life events. Le Carré's Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, and Smiley's People have been best sellers, as well as being block-busters on TV.

The discriminating and discerning reader will find considerable value in the world of intelligence fiction. While the professional benefits cannot be disregarded, neither should the many hours of pure pleasure and relaxation which such reading affords.

INTELLIGENCE PERIODICALS

An interesting, comparatively new phenomenon in the literature of intelligence has been the appearance of basically non-governmental periodicals on intelligence. Several of them are worth noting.

1. Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene (FILS).

This publication, edited by Thomas F. Troy, is a bimonthly newsletter/book review, first issued in February 1982. It contains feature articles, largely triggered by some aspect of the intelligence literary scene; reviews of new intelligence books; a listing of periodical articles on intelligence; and, some note of works in progress. (Available by subscription from the publisher: University Publications of America, 44 North Market Street, Frederick, Maryland 21701).

2. Intelligence Report.

Published monthly (commencing in March 1979) by the Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the American Bar Association (1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637). This publication discusses current court cases and legislation involving intelligence and security issues (including FOIA). Also pertinent book reviews.

3. American Intelligence Journal.

Published by the National Military Intelligence Association (NMIA), 1606 Laurel Lane, Annapolis, Maryland 21401. Available to members only by subscription, although individual copies can be purchased. NMIA membership includes both active and retired intelligence personnel.


4. Signal.

This is the monthly journal of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA), 5641 Burke Centre Parkway, Burke, Virginia 22015-2289. It specializes in articles on C^3I . Although articles of "I" interest appear in most issues, one issue a year has been devoted particularly to "I". AFCEA membership is world-wide; there is a large corporate membership, as well as active duty and retired officers interested in the field of C^3I .

5. Periscope.

Published quarterly by the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), 6723 Whittier Avenue, McLean, Virginia 22101. While much of this periodical is taken up with the affairs of AFIO, and the latter

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role in intelligence legislation and the teaching of intelligence, it also carries excellent book reviews by former intelligence professionals. Available to members only, or by special request.

6. Cryptologia.

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Described as a quarterly journal devoted to all aspects of cryptology, it is published by the Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, Terre Haute, Indiana 47803. While of particular interest to the cryptologic buff - professional or amateur - it often carries articles of historical interest in the field, and includes book reviews.

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